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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Marla G. Decker *
Stephen R. McCullough **
I. INTRODUCTION
The authors have endeavored to select from the many appellate
cases those that have the most significant precedential value.
This year was characterized by a number of important decisions
involving the Fourth Amendment and the Confrontation Clause.
This article discusses decisions from the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia and the Supreme Court of Virginia up to and including the
cases handed down at the Supreme Court of Virginia's June 2008
sitting. Given the volume of noteworthy cases, the authors have
stressed the "take away" from the case without a lengthy discus-
sion of procedural history or settled legal principles. This article
also outlines some of the most consequential changes to Virginia
law enacted by the 2008 General Assembly in the areas of crimi-
nal law and procedure.
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence
For a variety of reasons, some prosecutors discharge their Bra-
dyl obligations by disclosing redacted or summary versions of ex-
culpatory evidence rather than verbatim versions. The defendant
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1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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in Garnett v. Commonwealth contended that he was entitled to
the "best evidence available for impeachment." 2 Addressing the
propriety of providing redacted information, the Supreme Court
of Virginia cautioned that 'the more prudent and expeditious
route would have been for the government to provide the record-
ings and transcripts."' 3 The court observed that "summaries of
exculpatory evidence must be complete and accurate."4 If a sum-
mary contains "omissions or inaccuracies" that "result[ ] in the
prejudicial suppression of material evidence favorable to the de-
fendant," a defendant could bring a viable Brady claim. 5 After re-
viewing in detail the summaries provided by the Commonwealth,
the court ultimately concluded that the defendant's due process
rights were not violated in this case. 6
B. Right To Choose Counsel
The Constitution protects a defendant's right to a lawyer of his
choosing. 7 In some instances, however, that right must yield to
other considerations. In Johnson v. Commonwealth, the defen-
dant argued that his right to counsel was infringed when the
court removed his attorney on the basis of a conflict of interest. 8
The defendant relied on the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez.9 In that case,
the Court held that an error by the trial court in refusing to per-
mit the defendant to choose his attorney constituted "structural"
error. 10 The Court of Appeals of Virginia first noted that labeling
an error as "structural" does not answer the question of whether
any error has been committed. I' Analyzing the decision in Gonza-
lez-Lopez, the Court of Appeals held that the Supreme Court of
the United States did not set out to alter the wide latitude af-
forded to trial courts in determining whether an attorney should
2. 275 Va. 397, 406, 657 S.E.2d 100, 106 (2008).
3. Id. at 407, 657 S.E.2d at 107 (quoting Garnett v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 524,
532, 642 S.E.2d 782, 786 (Ct. App. 2007)).
4. Id. at 409, 657 S.E.2d at 108.
5. Id. at 409-10, 657 S.E.2d at 108.
6. Id. at 410-16, 657 S.E.2d at 108-12.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. 50 Va. App. 600, 603-04, 652 S.E.2d 156, 157-58 (Ct. App. 2007).
9. Id.; see United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
10. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150.
11. Johnson, 50 Va. App. at 604, 652 S.E.2d at 158.
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be removed from a particular case. 12 In the case at bar, the trial
court properly concluded that counsel suffered from a conflict be-
cause counsel for Johnson also represented the principal witness
for the prosecution on different charges. 13 At trial, counsel would
have had to either vigorously cross-examine one client to discredit
his sworn testimony or protect one client at the expense of the
other by reducing the intensity of cross-examination. 14 Finally,
the court concluded that counsel's having obtained a waiver from
his client did not alter the outcome. 15 Ultimately, the structural-
error analysis of Gonzalez-Lopez does not alter the discretion tra-
ditionally afforded to trial courts in this area.
C. Confrontation Clause
Courts continue to address the implications of the Supreme
Court of the United States' decision in Crawford v. Washington.16
In three cases consolidated under the style of Magruder v. Com-
monwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed whether a
defendant has a right under the Sixth Amendment of the Consti-
tution to cross-examine the analyst who produces a certificate of
analysis of a substance. 17 Each defendant objected at trial on the
ground that the certificate of analysis constituted "testimonial"
evidence and, therefore, admitting the certificate of analysis
without the live testimony of the analyst offended the Confronta-
tion Clause.18 The court declined to reach the issue of whether
the certificates were in fact "testimonial."19 Instead, a closely di-
vided court concluded that the procedure set forth in Virginia
Code section 19.2-187.1 sufficed to protect a defendant's constitu-
tional rights.20 The court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause
provides four safeguards to a defendant: "physical presence, oath,
cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of
12. Id. at 604-05, 652 S.E.2d at 158.
13. Id. at 603-04, 652 S.E.2d at 157.
14. Id. at 606, 652 S.E.2d at 159.
15. Id. at 607, 652 S.E.2d at 159.
16. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
17. 275 Va. 283, 288, 657 S.E.2d 113, 115 (2008).
18. Id. at 289, 291, 293, 657 S.E.2d at 115-17.
19. Id. at 295, 657 S.E.2d at 118.
20. Id. at 289, 657 S.E.2d at 115.
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fact."21 The court held that the statutory mechanism found in
Virginia Code section 19.2-187.1 meets each of these safeguards.
The Magruder court also rejected the defendants' argument
that section 19.2-187.1 improperly requires defendants "to take
certain affirmative steps" to assert their confrontation rights. 22 In
other contexts, the court noted, defendants must make certain
disclosures or take certain steps to vindicate their constitutional
rights.23 The court brushed aside the defendants' argument that
the statutory procedure impermissibly requires them to produce a
witness, concluding that these due process concerns were not
properly before the court. 24 The court also observed that trial
courts can obviate these problems by requiring the prosecution to
call the witness in the first instance. 25 Furthermore, the court re-
jected the argument that the record must affirmatively reflect a
waiver of this right.26 Ultimately, the court agreed with the con-
clusion of the Court of Appeals of Virginia that 'Code § 19.2-
187.1 sets out a reasonable procedure to be followed in order for a
defendant to exercise his right to confront a particular limited
class of scientific witnesses at trial."' 27 Three justices dissented
from this holding.28 Two of the defendants in these cases have
filed a consolidated petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court of the United States.29
The defendant in Gilman v. Commonwealth was held in con-
tempt by a juvenile and domestic relations court. 30 The court pre-
pared a "certificate of conviction" detailing the circumstances of
the finding of contempt.31 When the defendant appealed the con-
tempt finding to the circuit court, she claimed a right to confront
21. Id. at 298-99, 657 S.E.2d at 120 (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846
(1990)).
22. Id. at 299, 657 S.E.2d at 121.
23. Id. at 300, 657 S.E.2d at 121.
24. Id. at 301, 657 S.E.2d at 122.
25. See id. at 301, 657 S.E.2d at 122.
26. Id. at 303-04, 657 S.E.2d at 123.
27. Id. at 301, 657 S.E.2d at 122 (quoting Brooks v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 155,
164, 638 S.E.2d 131, 136 (Ct. App. 2006)).
28. Id. at 309, 657 S.E.2d at 127 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Briscoe v. Virginia (No. 07-____) (U.S. Mar. 29, 2008),
available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/-rdfrdmanlbriscoepetition.pdf.
30. 275 Va. 222, 225, 657 S.E.2d 474, 475 (2008).
31. Id. at 225-26, 657 S.E.2d at 475.
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the judge who held her in contempt. 32 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia rejected this claim and held that adjudications for contempt,
including the summary petty contempt at issue here, were not
''criminal prosecutions" and thus did not fall within the scope of
the Confrontation Clause. 33 The court further disagreed with
Gilman's argument that her trial de novo in circuit court impli-
cated the Sixth Amendment.34 The court found that while a de-
fendant generally has a right to a de novo trial in circuit court,
the Virginia Code carves out a special and separate status for
contempt cases that does not result in a de novo trial.35 The court
noted that the circuit court is specifically permitted to consider as
evidence the district court's factual summary of the events that
occurred during the proceedings in the lower court. 36 The court
concluded that no Confrontation Clause violation had occurred. 37
In Wimbish v. Commonwealth, the defendant invoked the
Crawford framework in an effort to exclude the results of his
breath test generated by an intoxilyzer machine.38 First, with re-
spect to the test results generated by the machine, the Court of
Appeals of Virginia held that the intoxilyzer machine was not a
"witness" that could be "confronted."39 The court observed that
the defendant "blew into the machine, the machine analyzed his
breath and reported the results of its analysis. The machine was
the sole source of the test results. Thus the result of the breath
test was merely data produced by a machine, not a statement
produced by a witness."40
Second, the court held that the attestations made by the officer
likewise did not implicate the Confrontation Clause.41 As to the
statement by the officer that he had complied with approved me-
thods in testing the defendant's breath, the court concluded that
this statement was not hearsay but was simply the officer's opi-
32. Id. at 226, 657 S.E.2d at 475.
33. Id. at 228, 657 S.E.2d at 476.
34. Id., 657 S.E.2d at 476-77.
35. Id. at 230-31, 657 S.E.2d at 477-78 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-459 (Repl. Vol.
2004 & Cum. Supp. 2008)).
36. Id. at 230-31, 657 S.E.2d at 478.
37. Id. at 231, 657 S.E.2d at 478.
38. 51 Va. App. 474, 479, 658 S.E.2d 715, 718 (Ct. App. 2008).
39. Id. at 483-84, 658 S.E.2d at 719-20.
40. Id. at 483, 658 S.E.2d at 719-20.
41. Id. at 485-86, 658 S.E.2d at 721.
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nion that he had complied with the methods of the Department of
Forensic Science.4 2 Because the Confrontation Clause is con-
cerned only with testimonial hearsay, and the attestation was not
hearsay, the defendant's right to confront witnesses was not vi-
olated.43 Next, the court addressed Whether the statement by the
officer that "the equipment on which the breath test was con-
ducted has been tested within the past six months and found to
be accurate" infringed on the defendant's confrontation rights.44
The court held that the statement was hearsay, but not "testi-
monial" hearsay, for two reasons. 45 First, the certification was
admissible as a business record.46 Second, the statement was not
"accusatory" evidence presented "against" the defendant, but was
merely non-testimonial foundational evidence.47
In order to use the prior testimony of a witness, the witness
must be "unavailable."48 To establish unavailability, the prosecu-
tion must first make a good-faith effort to locate the witness. 49 In
Morgan v. Commonwealth, at the defendant's preliminary hear-
ing, a witness had identified the defendant as the man who
robbed her, and the witness was then cross-examined. 50 After the
preliminary hearing, this witness was deported to Pakistan.51
The prosecution issued two subpoenas for her, but she did not ap-
pear. 52 The trial court concluded that the witness was unavaila-
ble, and that the prosecution had exercised due diligence in seek-
ing to obtain her presence at trial. 53
The Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld this ruling, observing
that due diligence in this context is "that amount of prudence 'as
is properly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a
reasonable and prudent man under the particular circums-
tances."'54 Reasonable effort is required, but "every possibility, no
42. Id. at 486, 658 S.E.2d at 721.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 486-88, 658 S.E.2d at 721-22.
46. Id. at 489, 658 S.E.2d at 723.
47. Id.
48. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
49. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
50. 50 Va. App. 369, 371, 650 S.E.2d 541, 542 (Ct. App. 2007).
51. Id. at 372, 650 S.E.2d at 542.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 373-74, 650 S.E.2d at 543.
54. Id. at 375, 379, 650 S.E.2d at 544, 546 (quoting McDonnough v. Commonwealth,
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matter how remote, [need not] be exhausted."55 The court noted
that the prosecution had served two subpoenas and that the wit-
ness had twice before honored a subpoena. 56 Furthermore, the
prosecution had written letters to the victim's immigration attor-
ney seeking a postponement of the deportation proceedings until
after the trial.57 The prosecution also wrote to immigration au-
thorities to inform them of the need for the victim's testimony at
trial. 58 Finally, the court held that the prosecution was not re-
quired to seek an expedited visa for the witness from the embassy
in Pakistan.59 The court noted that it did not "delineate precisely
what steps the Commonwealth must take to demonstrate good
faith and due diligence in attempting to ensure the presence at
trial of a deported witness."60 On the facts of this case, however,
the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in determining
that the witness was, in fact, unavailable.61
In Abney v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reviewed a challenge to testimony admitted under the past recol-
lection recorded exception to the hearsay rule. 62 After detectives
reopened this cold case, the defendant was charged with murder-
ing his wife.63 The prosecution presented testimony of the defen-
dant's girlfriend from the time of the murder and an affidavit
that had been prepared in connection with litigation over a life
insurance policy for the defendant's deceased wife.64 The defen-
dant objected on Confrontation Clause grounds to the portions of
the affidavit that the witness could not independently recall. 65
The Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that the defendant's
rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by the
introduction of this affidavit.66 The court reasoned that the wit-
ness was, in fact, present for trial and the defendant could cross-
25 Va. App. 120, 128, 486 S.E.2d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 1997)).
55. Id. at 375, 650 S.E.2d at 544 (quoting McDonnough, 25 Va. App. at 129, 486
S.E.2d at 574).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id., 650 S.E.2d at 544-45.
59. Id. at 376-77, 650 S.E.2d at 545.
60. Id. at 379, 650 S.E.2d at 546.
61. Id.
62. 51 Va. App. 337, 346, 657 S.E.2d 796, 800 (Ct. App. 2008).
63. Id. at 343-44, 657 S.E.2d at 799.
64. Id. at 345-46, 657 S.E.2d at 800.
65. Id. at 348-49, 657 S.E.2d at 801.
66. Id. at 351-52, 657 S.E.2d at 803.
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examine her.67 The court further reasoned that "[tihe Confronta-
tion Clause includes no guarantee that every witness called by
the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is marred
by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion."68
D. Juries-Ex Parte Communications
At trial in Commonwealth v. Juares, the jury heard transla-
tions of a videotaped statement by the defendant from both the
officer who conducted the interview and from a court-appointed
interpreter. 69 During the course of its deliberations, the jury
asked court personnel if it could have an interpreter to assist in
understanding portions of the defendant's videotaped state-
ment.70 The court personnel did not convey this request to the
court or the parties, and responded that no interpreter would be
provided to the jury.71 Upon learning of this exchange, the defen-
dant unsuccessfully sought a mistrial. 72 The Court of Appeals of
Virginia reversed, concluding that the Commonwealth had failed
to refute the presumption of prejudice associated with ex parte
communications between jurors and third parties. 73 The Supreme
Court of Virginia upheld the decision of the trial court and re-
versed the Court of Appeals of Virginia. 74
The supreme court noted the existence of a presumption of pre-
judice if the ex parte communication between the jury and the
third party concerns "the matter pending before the jury."75 The
key question for the court in such a case is whether the communi-
cation "convey[s] any additional facts or opinions regarding the
guilt or innocence of [the defendant] [or] contain[s] any comment
on the law, the evidence or the testimony presented during the
trial."76 In this instance, the communication between the jury and
67. Id.
68. Id. at 350, 657 S.E.2d at 802 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 21-22
(1985) (per curiam)).
69. 274 Va. 812, 814, 651 S.E.2d 646, 647 (2007).
70. Id. at 815, 651 S.E.2d at 647.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 817, 651 S.E.2d at 648.
75. Id. at 816, 651 S.E.2d at 647 (quoting Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 315,
601 S.E.2d 555, 565 (2004)).
76. Id., 651 S.E.2d at 648.
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court personnel was not about such matters. Therefore, no pre-
sumption of prejudice arose. 77 It then.became incumbent upon
the defendant to establish the existence of prejudice, which he
failed to do.78
E. Role of the Court in Preliminary Hearings
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the role of the judge
in a preliminary hearing in Commonwealth v. Jackson, where the
Commonwealth sought to commit the defendant as a sexually vio-
lent predator. 79 Although sexually violent predator commitments
are civil, the court stated that the probable cause hearings in that
setting were analogous to preliminary hearings in criminal cas-
es. 80 The trial court conducted a statutorily required8l probable
cause hearing to determine whether the case should proceed to
trial, and the court concluded that the evidence was not sufficient
for a finding of probable cause.8 2
The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial court
must find probable cause if the Commonwealth's evidence estab-
lishes a prima facie case and the evidence is not "proven mani-
festly wrong or so inherently incredible that a reasonable person
would not believe it."83 The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed,
explaining that "[i]nherent in the court's function at a prelimi-
nary hearing is the exercise of the court's discretion in weighing
the evidence to determine whether probable cause has been
shown."84 The fact that the Commonwealth has produced "more
than a scintilla of evidence that a crime has been committed and
that the defendant committed that crime" is not dispositive.85 As
in a preliminary hearing in a criminal case, in a probable cause
hearing for a sexually violent predator commitment, a trial court
"acts as the trier of fact, considers the witnesses' testimony, ob-
serves the reaction of the witnesses during cross-examination,
77. Id. at 817, 651 S.E.2d at 648.
78. Id.
79. 276 Va. 184, 188, 661 S.E.2d 810, 811 (2008).
80. Id. at 191, 661 S.E.2d at 813.
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-906 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
82. Jackson, 276 Va. at 191, 661 S.E.2d at 813.
83. Id. at 193, 661 S.E.2d at 814.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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and evaluates the credibility of the witnesses."86 The court held
that the trial court could make an adverse credibility finding with
respect to the critical testimony of the Commonwealth's expert,
and that the court on appeal would not substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court.8 7
Justices Lemons and Kinser dissented, taking issue with the
fact-finding role ascribed to trial courts at preliminary hear-
ings. 88 Specifically, the two dissenting justices took the view that
the credibility of a witness is reserved for the trial unless the wit-
ness is incredible as a matter of law.8 9 Thus, in their view, a
judge's role at a preliminary hearing is "more circumscribed" than
the majority suggests. 90 Jackson may, in the long term, signifi-
cantly alter preliminary hearing practice in Virginia.
F. Withdrawing a Guilty Plea
The Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed the scope of a de-
fendant's ability to withdraw a guilty plea in Coleman v. Com-
monwealth.91 Based on a "written agreed disposition," Coleman
entered a guilty plea to "two counts of robbery, one count of use of
a firearm in the commission of robbery, and three misdemeanor
counts of assault and battery."92 The prosecution dismissed two
other charges, including one count of abduction and one charge of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.93 A few days before
his sentencing proceeding, Coleman moved to withdraw his guilty
plea, contending that he felt pressure to avoid a life sentence,
that he was stressed out, and that he had pled guilty out of
fear.94 He also said he wanted to prove his innocence. 95 However,
he offered no affidavits or other evidence to support a defense to
the charges. 96 The trial court denied the motion. 97
86. Id.
87. Id. at 197, 661 S.E.2d at 816.
88. Id. at 198, 661 S.E.2d at 817 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 201, 661 S.E.2d at 819.
90. Id. at 199, 661 S.E.2d at 818.
91. 51 Va. App. 284, 286, 657 S.E.2d 164, 165 (Ct. App. 2008).
92. Id. at 286-87, 657 S.E.2d at 165-66.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 287-88, 657 S.E.2d at 166.
95. Id. at 288, 657 S.E.2d at 166.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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The Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld this decision. 98 The de-
fendant, quoting from Parris v. Commonwealth,99 asserted that
"the least influence" and "fear" required the trial court to grant
the motion to vacate his guilty plea.OO The court found this ar-
gument unpersuasive, however, noting that "every guilty plea is
the product of some influence on a defendant."101 A guilty plea
that is prompted by a fear of a harsh sentence cannot require a
court to grant a guilty plea.102 Such a holding would run counter
to the discretion trial courts are afforded in such matters. 103 The
court also concluded that the record offered no support for the de-
fendant's assertions that he was "going crazy" and his "mind was
gone."104
Finally, the defendant, relying on Justus v. Commonwealth,105
contended that so long as he had any defense to the crimes, the
trial court was required to grant his motion to vacate his pleas.106
His defense, he argued, was that the eyewitnesses were mistaken
in their identification.10 7 The court noted that in Justus, the de-
fendant presented affidavits to show that she resided in the dwel-
ling that she had been charged with burglarizing and, therefore,
she could not be guilty of burglary.108 The defendant in Justus
had also presented evidence that she acted in self-defense.109 In
contrast, Coleman provided the court with no evidence of mista-
ken identity.110 The eyewitness to the crime had testified earlier
that he knew the defendant because he had worked with him at
the Goodwill store the defendant was charged with robbing.ill
Five witnesses said they immediately recognized the defendant
when he entered the store. 112 Under these facts, the court con-
cluded that the defense was "dilatory or formal" rather than a
98. Id. at 293, 657 S.E.2d at 169.
99. 189 Va. 321, 52 S.E.2d 872 (1949).
100. Coleman, 51 Va. App. at 290, 657 S.E.2d at 167.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 291, 657 S.E.2d at 168.
103. Id., 657 S.E.2d at 167.
104. Id. at 291-92, 657 S.E.2d at 168.
105. 274 Va. 143, 645 S.E.2d 284 (2007).
106. Coleman, 51 Va. App. at 292, 657 S.E.2d at 168.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 292-93, 657 S.E.2d at 168.
111. Id. at 292, 657 S.E.2d at 168.
112. Id.
20081
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"reasonable basis for [a] substantive" defense.113 Given these cir-
cumstances, the court held that the trial court committed no
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty
pleas." 4
Future cases will provide guidance concerning the breadth of a
trial court's discretion to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
before sentencing for cases that fall somewhere between the two
extremes of Justus and Coleman.
G. Venue
The defendant in Morris v. Commonwealth, after becoming un-
conscious, was transported from her home in Henrico County to a
hospital in Hanover County.1 15 At the hospital, medical personnel
discovered syringes and a smoking device which led to criminal
charges against the defendant for possession of heroin and pos-
session of cocaine.11 6 The defendant contended that Hanover
County was not a proper venue because she was unconscious at
the time she possessed the drugs in Hanover County, and, there-
fore, did not knowingly and voluntarily possess the drugs in that
county.11 7 The Court of Appeals of Virginia disagreed, noting that
the defendant acknowledged that she originally had possessed
the drugs with an understanding of their nature and charac-
ter.1 1 8 The court reasoned that possession of drugs is "an ongoing
and continuing offense."119 "The fact that [the defendant] may
have been unconscious when she was transported into Hanover
does not negate the fact that she knowingly and intentionally
possessed the narcotics when she chose to carry them on her per-
son."120 Therefore, venue in Hanover County was proper.1 21
113. Id. at 293, 657 S.E.2d at 168-69 (quoting Justus v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 143,
155-56, 645 S.E.2d 284, 290 (2007)).
114. Id., 657 S.E.2d at 169.
115. 51 Va. App. 459, 463, 658 S.E.2d 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2008).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 464, 658 S.E.2d at 710.
118. Id. at 466, 658 S.E.2d at 711.
119. Id. at 467, 658 S.E.2d at 712.
120. Id. at 468, 658 S.E.2d at 712.
121. Id. at 469, 658 S.E.2d at 713.
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H. Sentencing Issues
Virginia Code section 19.2-295.2 permits, and in some cases re-
quires, a trial court to impose-in addition to the sentence rec-
ommended by a jury-a period of post-release supervision.122 In
Alston v. Commonwealth, after convicting the defendant of volun-
tary manslaughter, a jury sentenced him to serve three years in
prison. 123 Over Alston's objection, the court imposed an addition-
al three-year period of post-release supervision.124 Alston con-
tended that the period of post-release supervision constituted a
sentence in excess of the statutory maximum and thus contra-
vened the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States.125
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court of the United
States, examining the scope of the right to a jury trial under the
Sixth Amendment, held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior con-
viction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."126 Building on this frame-
work, in Blakely v. Washington, the Court explained that the
'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts re-
flected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."127
The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the term of post-
release supervision imposed on Alston did not contravene this
precedent.128 The court first observed that the post-release su-
pervision statute, section 19.2-295.2, can be read harmoniously
with section 19.2-295, which provides that the jury ascertains a
defendant's punishment. 129 The relevant statutory maximum, for
purposes of Virginia law, includes the term imposed by the jury
plus the term of post-release supervision. 130 The court further
122. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.2 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
123. 274 Va. 759, 762, 652 S.E.2d 456, 458 (2007).
124. Id. at 763, 652 S.E.2d at 458.
125. Id.
126. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
127. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).
128. Alston, 274 Va. at 771, 652 S.E.2d at 463.
129. Id. at 769, 652 S.E.2d at 461-62. Section 19.2-295 states that "the term of con-
finement... of a person convicted of a criminal offense, shall be ascertained by the jury."
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
130. See Alston, 274 Va. at 769-70, 652 S.E.2d at 462.
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reasoned that Virginia law, unlike the sentencing schemes at is-
sue in Apprendi and Blakely, does not infringe upon the Sixth
Amendment because it "does not require that a trial court find
proof of particular facts independent of the jury's conviction."131
The defendant in Wright v. Commonwealthi32 raised a differ-
ent challenge to the period of post-release supervision. He con-
tended that the trial court could not impose a period of post-
release supervision on him because it was not a part of the
"Agreed Disposition" that was the basis for his plea of guilty.' 33
This plea agreement specified, among other things, that the pros-
ecution would amend the indictment from capital murder to first
degree murder and that the defendant was to plead guilty to the
first degree murder charge and receive a life sentence. 134 Howev-
er, the plea agreement was silent on the subject of a period of
post-release supervision.135 The defendant contended that he
should either be sentenced in accord with his plea agreement, or
be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.136 In rejecting this ar-
gument, the Supreme Court of Virginia first observed that the pe-
riod of post-release supervision, and its concomitant suspended
period of incarceration, is mandatory.137 Second, drawing from
principles of contract law, the court held that the period of post-
release supervision, along with the suspended period of incarcera-
tion, formed a part of the legal background of the plea agreement
and was therefore incorporated into the plea agreement.1 38 The
trial court thus did not "reject" the negotiated plea agreement,
and the defendant could not withdraw from it.139
The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Martin v. Common-
wealth that a trial court can order a defendant to pay child sup-
port as part of a suspended sentence.1 40 The defendant was con-
131. Id. at 771, 652 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting Alston v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 115,
121, 637 S.E.2d 344, 347 (Ct. App. 2006)).
132. 275 Va. 77, 655 S.E.2d 7 (2008).
133. Id. at 79-80, 655 S.E.2d at 8.
134. Id. at 79, 655 S.E.2d at 8.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 81, 655 S.E.2d at 9. Rule 3A:8(c)(4) permits a defendant to withdraw from a
guilty plea such as the one at issue in Wright if the trial court rejects it. Va. S. Ct. R.
3A:8(c)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
137. Wright, 275 Va. at 81, 655 S.E.2d at 9.
138. Id. at 81-82, 655 S.E.2d at 10.
139. Id. at 82, 655 S.E.2d at 10.
140. 274 Va. 733, 735-36, 652 S.E.2d 109, 111 (2007).
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victed of driving after having been declared a habitual offend-
er. 141 He contended that the order to pay child support was im-
proper because it was unrelated to his conviction.14 2 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia disagreed, noting that trial courts are
statutorily permitted to require child or spousal support upon
placing a defendant on probation.143 Therefore, the trial court
committed no abuse of discretion.144
A trial court's sentencing discretion, while broad, is not unli-
mited. In Howell v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia held that a trial court abused its discretion in ordering a de-
fendant who burglarized a store to install a security system as
part of an order of restitution.145 The court reasoned that the
purpose of restitution is to replace losses caused by the crime and
to make good an injury suffered by the victim.146 The alarm sys-
tem and the owners' fear that resulted from the burglary were
"related" to the crime but, ultimately, the connection between the
burglary and the alarm system was too attenuated to force a de-
fendant to pay for the alarm system as part of an order of restitu-
tion. 147
In Booker v. Commonwealth, the jury inquired during its deli-
berations whether the judge could alter the jury's sentence.148
The trial court answered, over the defendant's objection, that "the
Court has the power to reduce, but not increase the sentence.
However, you shall not concern yourselves with what happens af-
ter your verdict is returned."149 The defendant contended that
this response would lead the jury to speculate about what the
court might do and thus tainted the jury's sentencing recommen-
dation.150 The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed. The court rea-
soned that there is
141. Id. at 734, 652 S.E.2d at 110.
142. Id. at 735, 652 S.E.2d at 110.
143. Id., 652 S.E.2d at 111 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-305(B) (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
144. Id. at 736, 652 S.E.2d at 111.
145. 274 Va. 737, 741, 652 S.E.2d 107, 109 (2007).
146. Id. at 740, 652 S.E.2d at 108.
147. Id. at 740-41, 652 S.E.2d at 108-09.
148. 276 Va. 37, 39, 661 S.E.2d 461, 462 (2008).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 40, 661 S.E.2d at 462.
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[a]n important distinction between instructions that properly further
the goal of "truth in sentencing" by removing the possibility that a
jury will act upon misconceptions, and those instructions that have
the improper effect of inviting the jury to speculate concerning the
likelihood of future actions that may ultimately affect the length of a
defendant's incarceration. 15 1
The court found that the instruction provided to the jury was of
the latter variety because it permitted the jury to speculate that
the trial court might later reduce the defendant's sentence, and it
led the jury to conclude "that its role in the sentencing process
was minimal." 152
In Smith v. Commonwealth, the defendant pled guilty to
charges of burglary and grand larceny.153 During the sentencing
phase of the case, the prosecution adduced evidence in the form of
written declarations by the victims setting forth the value of sto-
len items.1 54 The prosecution then asked for restitution based on
these statements.1 55 The defendant, who had received these
statements well in advance of trial, objected that he could not de-
termine from the statements whether the estimated losses
represented new or replacement value.1 56 He contended that the
victims must be present in court and subjected to cross-
examination. 157 The trial court overruled the objection and relied
on the documents to assess the amount of restitution.158 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, observing that the rules of
evidence are relaxed during the sentencing proceeding, and,
therefore, that a court can consider hearsay evidence in reaching
an appropriate amount for restitution.1 59 The court further noted
that the defendant "did not challenge the factual accuracy of the
proffer. Nor did he present any evidence contradicting the valua-
tions or, for that matter, make any effort to compel the victims to
take the stand and submit to cross-examination as adverse wit-
nesses."160 The court held that "a sentencing court, 'in determin-
151. Id. at 42, 661 S.E.2d at 463-64.
152. Id. at 42-43, 661 S.E.2d at 464.
153. 52 Va. App. 26, 28, 660 S.E.2d 691, 692 (Ct. App. 2008).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 28-29, 660 S.E.2d at 692.
156. Id. at 29, 660 S.E.2d at 692.
157. Id. at 30, 660 S.E.2d at 693.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 30-31, 660 S.E.2d at 693.
160. Id. at 33, 660 S.E.2d at 694.
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ing the appropriate amount of restitution, may consider hearsay
evidence that bears 'minimal indicia of reliability' so long as the
defendant is given an opportunity to refute that evidence."'1 61
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed but did not resolve
the ongoing controversy about "deferred disposition" in criminal
cases in Moreau v. Fuller.162 The defendant in Moreau was an
adult charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor.163
At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Moreau of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of the City of Danville ruled that the
evidence was sufficient for a finding of guilt, but further ruled
that the case would be continued to a later date for final disposi-
tion. 164 The Commonwealth's Attorney obtained a writ of man-
damus in the Circuit Court of the City of Danville on the basis
that the juvenile and domestic relations court lacked the statuto-
ry authority to make such a deferred finding.165 The Supreme
Court of Virginia reversed, concluding that a writ of mandamus
does not lie when the function of the court is a discretionary
one. 166 Entry of a judgment of guilt, the court held, is a discretio-
nary rather than a ministerial function.167 Furthermore, the
court reasoned that the written order of the court at issue merely
continued the case and that "[s]uch a disposition is within the
discretionary authority of the court and as such is not subject to
mandamus."168 In two separate concurrences, Justice Koontz and
Justice Kinser, joined by Justices Agee and Keenan, stressed that
the court was not resolving the propriety of a "deferred disposi-
tion" in the absence of specific statutory authorization. 169
161. Id. (quoting United States v. Bourne, 130 F.3d 1444, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997)).
162. 276 Va. 127, 131, 661 S.E.2d 841, 843 (2008); id. at 139, 661 S.E.2d at 848
(Koontz, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 131, 661 S.E.2d at 843 (majority opinion).
164. Id. at 131-32, 661 S.E.2d at 843-44.
165. Id. at 132-33, 661 S.E.2d at 844.
166. Id. at 135, 661 S.E.2d at 845-46 (quoting In re Commonwealth's Attorney, 265 Va.
313, 318, 576 S.E.2d 458, 461 (2003)).
167. Id. at 138, 661 S.E.2d at 847.
168. Id. at 138-39, 661 S.E.2d at 847.
169. Id. at 139, 661 S.E.2d at 848 (Koontz, J., concurring); id. at 140, 661 S.E.2d at 848
(Kinser, J., concurring).
20081
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
This year, the Supreme Court of Virginia, often by a divided
vote, handed down several decisions that will be relied upon by
the defense bar for years to come. However, the prosecution
scored a significant victory in the Moore decision, discussed be-
low.
A. Lawfulness of a Search
In Moore v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
concluded that a full custodial arrest, made in violation of the
misdemeanor summons statute, rose to the level of a constitu-
tional violation.170 In Moore's case, police stopped him for driving
on a suspended license and, rather than issue a summons and re-
lease him as required by statute, police subjected Moore to a full
custodial arrest.171 The search incident to arrest yielded a small
quantity of cocaine. 172 Based on this and other evidence, he was
convicted of possession with the intent to distribute.173 The court
concluded that because the arrest was unconstitutional, the ex-
clusionary rule applied and the evidence against Moore should
have been suppressed.174 The court unanimously rejected the
Commonwealth's argument that the officer's failure to issue a
summons was not an error of constitutional magnitude.175
Virginia appealed this determination to the Supreme Court of
the United States, which granted a writ of certiorari, and in a
unanimous decision written by Justice Scalia, reversed.176 The
Court began by examining whether statutes and case law at the
time of the nation's founding incorporated state strictures on ar-
rests. 177 The Court could not find evidence for such a proposition
and, in its absence, the Court turned to "traditional standards of
170. Moore v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 717, 725, 636 S.E.2d 395, 400 (2006). For the
summons statute, see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
171. Id. at 719, 636 S.E.2d at 396.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 725, 636 S.E.2d at 400.
175. Id. at 720, 636 S.E.2d at 397.
176. Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1601, 1608 (2008) (Justice Ginsburg authorized
a concurring opinion agreeing with the outcome).
177. Id. at 1602-03.
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reasonableness."17 8 The Court observed that the standard of
probable cause has long been equated with constitutional reason-
ableness, and the Court could see no reason to deviate from it in
this context. 179 The Court concluded that "[a] State is free to pre-
fer one search-and-seizure policy among the range of constitu-
tionally permissible options, but its choice of a more restrictive
option does not render the less restrictive ones unreasonable, and
hence unconstitutional."180 The Court also observed that the
probable cause standard satisfies the need for administrable rules
and for consistency in the Fourth Amendment context. 181 Finally,
the Court upheld the search incident to arrest, concluding that
because the arrest was constitutional, the officers could rely on
the bright line rule announced in United States v. Robinson to
search Moore.18 2 The Court ultimately
reaffirm [ed] against a novel challenge what [it has] signaled for more
than half a century. When officers have probable cause to believe
that a person has committed a crime in their presence, the Fourth
Amendment permits them to make an arrest, and to search the sus-
pect in order to safeguard evidence and ensure their own safety. 183
The scope of the exigent-circumstances search of a home was at
issue in Commonwealth v. Robertson.184 Danville police respond-
ed to a report of gunshots.l85 The gunman, Robertson, was alone
in the home.l86 After a tense standoff lasting thirty-five minutes,
the police subdued Robertson with a taser as he sat on a window-
sill.187 After arresting Robertson, police broke through the barri-
caded door to the home and seized a shotgun.iS8 The defendant
filed a motion to suppress the weapon, arguing that the officers'
entry into the home violated his Fourth Amendment rights.i89
178. Id. at 1604.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1606.
181. Id. at 1606-07.
182. Id. at 1607-08. In United States v. Robinson, the Supreme Court of the United
States stated that "[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to
the arrest requires no additional justification." 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
183. Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1608.
184. 275 Va. 559, 561, 659 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2008).
185. Id. at 562, 659 S.E.2d at 323.
186. Id. at 562-63, 659 S.E.2d at 323.
187. Id. at 562, 659 S.E.2d at 323.
188. Id. at 563, 659 S.E.2d at 324.
189. Id.
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The defendant lost in the trial court, but prevailed in the Court of
Appeals of Virginia.190 The Commonwealth appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia, and the supreme court likewise con-
cluded that the search of the home was unconstitutional. 191
The Commonwealth argued that the warrantless search of the
defendant's home was justified on two grounds: first, as a "protec-
tive sweep" search, and second, pursuant to the exigent circums-
tances exception to the warrant requirement.192 The court held
that no protective sweep of the home was justified because the de-
fendant was arrested outside of his home and there was no indi-
cation that the "home harbored anyone posing a danger to the in-
dividuals present at the arrest scene."193 The court noted that the
rationale of the "protective sweep" exception to the warrant re-
quirement is to protect bystanders or the police from a dangerous
person who might be hiding in the home.194 That rationale simply
did not apply in this case. 195
The court further held that the exigent circumstances excep-
tion to the warrant requirement did not apply.196 The court listed
certain factors that can justify a warrantless entry based on ex-
igent circumstances:
(1) [T~he degree of urgency involved and the time required to get a
warrant; (2) the officers' reasonable belief that contraband is about
to be removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to others, in-
cluding police officers left to guard the site; (4) information that the
possessors of the contraband are aware that the police may be on
their trail; (5) whether the offense is serious, or involves violence; (6)
whether officers reasonably believe the suspects are armed; (7)
whether there is, at the time of entry, a clear showing of probable
cause; (8) whether the officers have a strong reason to believe the
suspects are actually present in the premises; (9) the likelihood of
escape if the suspects are not swiftly apprehended; and (10) the sus-
pects' recent entry into the premises after hot pursuit. 19 7
190. Id. at 562, 566, 659 S.E.2d at 323, 325.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 564, 659 S.E.2d at 324.
193. Id. at 564-65, 659 S.E.2d at 324-25.
194. Id. at 564, 659 S.E.2d at 324.
195. Id. at 564-65, 659 S.E.2d at 325.
196. Id. at 565, 659 S.E.2d at 325.
197. Id. (quoting Robinson v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 26, 41-42, 639 S.E.2d 217, 226
(2007)).
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Applying these factors, the court found that no exigent cir-
cumstances were present that would justify a warrantless en-
try. 198 Therefore, the court upheld the court of appeals' decision
that the evidence found in the home must be suppressed. 199
In Anderson v. Commonwealth, the defendant challenged the
propriety of a seizure of his DNA upon his arrest for rape. 200 Vir-
ginia Code section 19.2-310.2:1 requires that a DNA sample be
taken for certain felony crimes.201 Upon analysis, Anderson's
DNA sample yielded a "cold hit" that linked him to a 1991
rape. 202 The defendant contended that the warrantless seizure of
his DNA violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.203 The
Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this argument, observing
that, upon arrest, defendants are subjected to routine booking
measures, including fingerprinting.204 The court reasoned that
"[a] DNA sample of the accused taken upon arrest, while more
revealing, is no different in character than acquiring fingerprints
upon arrest."205 Once a defendant is arrested, the court found,
the state has a legitimate interest not only in identifying the de-
fendant but also in "'maintaining a permanent record to solve
other past and future crimes."' 206 Finally, the court observed that
other state and federal courts have accepted the similarity be-
tween fingerprinting and DNA samples. 207 In sum, no "'addition-
al finding of individualized suspicion"' was required for a DNA
sample to be taken. 208
B. Probable Cause
Whether an officer had individualized suspicion that a person
might be armed and dangerous was at issue in McCain v. Com-
198. Id.
199. Id. at 565-66, 659 S.E.2d at 325.
200. 274 Va. 469, 472-73, 650 S.E.2d 702, 704 (2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2473
(2008).
201. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
202. Anderson, 274 Va. at 473, 650 S.E.2d at 704.
203. Id. at 474, 650 S.E.2d at 704.
204. Id., 650 S.E.2d at 705.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 474-75, 650 S.E.2d at 705 (quoting Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th
Cir. 1992)).
207. Id. at 475, 650 S.E.2d at 705.
208. Id. at 477, 650 S.E.2d at 706 (quoting Jones, 962 F.2d at 306).
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monwealth.209 In the early morning hours, the police made a traf-
fic stop in a violent, high crime, high drug neighborhood.210 The
defendant was a passenger in the car.211 Prior to the traffic stop,
the police had observed the defendant walk up to a house and,
less than a minute later, return to the car.212 In addition, the po-
lice officer had been involved in a controlled drug purchase at this
house "months" before the stop at issue.213 Following the stop,
the officer learned that the license of the driver of the vehicle was
suspended.214 He asked the defendant if he could perform a
"frisk" or a "pat down," but the defendant refused.215 Neverthe-
less, the officer proceeded to pat down the defendant, who ap-
peared "edgy."216 The officer recovered a gun from the defendant's
waistband and placed him under arrest. 21 7 During the search in-
cident to arrest, the officer discovered cocaine in the defendant's
pocket.218 At trial, the officer testified that he conducted a pat
down of every person he interacted with in that neighborhood.219
The trial court denied a motion to suppress the cocaine. 220
The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the officer
lacked sufficient facts to warrant the pat down. 221 Although the
type of neighborhood and the time of day were relevant, the court
reasoned, they did not provide the police with "a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting" that the defendant was armed
and dangerous. 222 The type of offense for which the vehicle was
stopped, a minor traffic infraction, the court further noted, did
not evince any danger.223 Although the officer had what the court
described as a "hunch" that the defendant might be involved in a
drug transaction, his presence at a house where a drug transac-
tion had occurred months before did not create sufficient reason-
209. See 275 Va. 546, 549, 659 S.E.2d 512, 514 (2008).
210. Id. at 550-51, 659 S.E.2d at 514-15.
211. Id. at 550, 659 S.E.2d at 514.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id., 659 S.E.2d at 514-15.
215. Id. at 550-51, 659 S.E.2d at 515.
216. Id. at 551, 659 S.E.2d at 515.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 549, 659 S.E.2d at 514.
221. Id. at 555, 659 S.E.2d at 517.
222. Id. at 554, 659 S.E.2d at 517.
223. See id.
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able suspicion. 224 The fact that the defendant appeared nervous,
the court concluded, did not alter the outcome because he was co-
operative, did not make any furtive movements, and correctly
identified himself to the officer.225 Finally, the court stressed that
officers are not authorized to "frisk all persons."226 Three justices
dissented from this holding, finding that the "specific articulable
facts" known to the officers justified the search.227
The defendant in Buhrman v. Commonwealth challenged the
existence of probable cause to arrest her for possession of a hand-
rolled cigarette that the officer believed was a marijuana ciga-
rette.228 The officer had noticed Buhrman walking unsteadily in-
side a convenience store and observed her almost fall asleep be-
side a frozen drink machine. 229 The officer followed Buhrman to
her car and "noticed hand-rolled cigarettes in the interior door
handle."230 Based on the faint odor and coloration of the ciga-
rettes, the officer suspected that they contained marijuana.231
The officer arrested the defendant for possession of marijuana.232
During the search incident to the arrest, the officer found cocaine,
heroin, and marijuana in the defendant's car and in her purse.233
At trial, the defendant unsuccessfully sought to suppress this
evidence. 234
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. 235 The court first ob-
served that hand-rolled cigarettes are often used for legitimate
purposes and, therefore, that additional evidence to support a
conclusion of illegal activity was necessary. 236 However, the de-
fendant did not act elusively or appear nervous. 237 Nor did the
testimony adduced at trial link the officer's observation of the
224. Id. at 554-55, 659 S.E.2d at 517.
225. Id. at 555, 659 S.E.2d at 517.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 555-56, 659 S.E.2d at 518 (Carrico, S.J., dissenting).
228. 275 Va. 501, 504, 659 S.E.2d 325, 326-27 (2008).
229. Id. at 503-04, 659 S.E.2d at 326.
230. Id. at 504, 659 S.E.2d at 326.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id., 659 S.E.2d at 327.
235. Id. at 508, 659 S.E.2d at 329.
236. Id. at 506, 659 S.E.2d at 328.
237. Id. at 506-07, 659 S.E.2d at 328.
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"faint odor" and "coloration" of the cigarettes to marijuana. 238
Moreover, the court observed that the evidence of the defendant's
intoxication did not indicate that hand-rolled cigarettes contained
marijuana, as opposed to tobacco.239 Under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, the court held, the officer lacked probable cause to
arrest the defendant for possession of marijuana. 240 Three justic-
es dissented from this holding.241
C. "Plain Feel" Search
In Cost v. Commonwealth, the defendant contended that the of-
ficer lacked probable cause to seize capsules of heroin from his
pocket.242 As the officer walked past the defendant, who was
seated in a car, he noticed the defendant "immediately reach[ ]
across his body towards his left front pants pocket."243 Suspicious
of this sudden movement, the officer "asked Cost what he was
reaching for."244 The officer instructed the defendant to exit the
vehicle, whereupon the defendant agreed to a pat down, but not
to a search. 245 When the officer touched the pocket toward which
the defendant had been reaching, he immediately felt numerous
capsules inside. 246 The officer retrieved a plastic bag, which was
later determined to contain twenty capsules of heroin. 247 The de-
fendant contended that this evidence should have been sup-
pressed at trial because the illegal nature of the capsules could
not have been apparent to the officer.248 The Supreme Court of
Virginia agreed with the defendant. The court observed that an
officer is justified in removing an item during a pat-down "when
the character of the object felt by the officer is immediately ap-
parent either as a weapon or some form of contraband."249 The
court found that other legal drugs are commonly packaged in cap-
238. Id. at 507, 659 S.E.2d at 328.
239. Id. at 506-07, 659 S.E.2d at 328.
240. Id. at 507-08, 659 S.E.2d at 329.
241. Id. at 508-09, 659 S.E.2d at 329-30 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
242. 275 Va. 246, 249, 657 S.E.2d 505, 506 (2008).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 251, 657 S.E.2d at 507.
249. Id. at 251-52, 657 S.E.2d at 508.
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sule form.250 Therefore, it could not have been "immediately ap-
parent" that the capsules contained heroin. 251 Nor was there any
action on the part of the defendant that could be characterized as
"furtive."252 As for the defendant's refusal to respond to the offic-
er's questions, the defendant was not required to answer any
questions. 253 Justices Lemons and Kinser dissented from the
court's holding.254
D. Consent To Search
Two cases illustrate the difficulty of suppressing evidence once
consent is given for a search. In Malbrough v. Commonwealth,
during the course of a traffic stop, police officers noticed a hand-
gun in plain sight.255 After a brief conversation and a check of the
occupants' driver's licenses, the police sought and obtained con-
sent to search the car.256 An officer placed the gun in his waist-
band and another conducted a search of the two passengers,
which yielded no contraband. 257 The officer then told the defen-
dant that he was free to leave.258 After making this statement,
the officer asked the defendant if he could search the vehicle and
whether the defendant "had anything illegal on his person."259 In
response, the defendant began to pull items from his pockets. 260
The officer told the defendant 'not to put his hands in his pock-
ets ... I would do the checking."'261 The defendant stated that 'it
was all right"' and raised his hands in the air. 262 The officer
found cocaine and marijuana in the defendant's pants pocket.263
The police vehicles did not block the defendant's car and the en-
tire encounter lasted thirteen minutes. 264
250. Id. at 253, 657 S.E.2d at 508.
251. Id. at 254, 657 S.E.2d at 509.
252. Id. at 253, 657 S.E.2d at 508-09.
253. Id., 657 S.E.2d at 509.
254. Id. at 254-55, 657 S.E.2d at 509-10 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
255. 275 Va. 163, 166, 655 S.E.2d 1, 2 (2008).
256. Id. at 167, 655 S.E.2d at 2-3.
257. Id.
258. Id., 655 S.E.2d at 3.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 166, 168, 655 S.E.2d at 2, 3.
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The defendant sought to suppress this evidence, arguing that
the search was invalid because "a reasonable person would not
have felt free to leave the scene."265 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia disagreed. The court noted that the defendant's vehicle was
not hemmed in by the police vehicles, his driver's license and reg-
istration had been returned to his vehicle, and he had been told
he was free to leave.266 Although the police still had the defen-
dant's gun, he did not ask for its return and there was no further
mention made of it.267 Although the defendant was questioned
about a shooting, the officers were satisfied with the answers
they received. 268 Also important for the court was the fact that
the officers did not draw or brandish their weapons, use hostile
tones of voice, accuse the defendant of wrongdoing, or make any
intimidating gestures. 269 Finally, the court deferred to the trial
court's factual finding that the defendant had consented to the
search.270 Justice Koontz, joined by Chief Justice Hassell, dis-
sented. 27 1
The consent to search, this time of a home, was at issue in
Glenn v. Commonwealth.272 Police officers, seeking to arrest
Glenn in connection with a robbery, arrived at his grandparents'
home.273 The officers promptly arrested Glenn and inquired of his
grandfather, Ernest Brooks, if he owned the home. 274 Brooks
could not speak because of a stroke, but he nodded to indicate he
did own the home.275 Brooks then expressed his assent to a
search of the home. 276 In one of the bedrooms used by the defen-
dant, the officers found a backpack that contained evidence link-
ing Glenn to the robbery. 277 Glenn contended that his grandfa-
ther could not authorize a search of Glenn's personal property
265. Id. at 169, 655 S.E.2d at 4.
266. Id. at 170, 655 S.E.2d at 4.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 171, 655 S.E.2d at 5.
271. Id. at 172, 655 S.E.2d at 6 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
272. 275 Va. 123, 127, 654 S.E.2d 910, 911 (2008).
273. Id. at 127-28, 654 S.E.2d at 911.
274. Id. at 128, 654 S.E.2d at 911-12.
275. Id., 654 S.E.2d at 912.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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that was located in a closed container in a bedroom that Glenn
occupied. 278
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the court found
that the resolution turned on the authority of Glenn's grandfa-
ther to consent to a search of closed containers located in a house
owned by the grandfather.279 The court found that the grandfa-
ther's actual authority was not critical to the outcome. 280 The key
for the court was whether the defendant's grandfather possessed
"apparent authority to consent to the search, as it appeared to an
objectively reasonable police officer."281 If he did, "the consent
[was] valid for Fourth Amendment purposes."282 The court noted
that the backpack did not bear any particular indicia of owner-
ship that might have signaled its ownership by the defendant and
it was found in a room open to all occupants of the house. 283 The
fact that it was later determined that the defendant owned the
backpack did not alter the outcome, the court found.284 The exis-
tence of some ambiguity regarding the ownership of the backpack
did not render the actions of the police unreasonable. 28 5 Finally,
Glenn never objected to the search of the backpack.286 In sum,
"[t]he facts available to the officers at the time of the search of the
Brooks house were sufficient to lead an objectively reasonable po-
lice officer to believe that Brooks had authority to consent to a
search of the backpack."287
IV. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Virginia Courts addressed a number of evidentiary issues that
arose in the criminal context.
278. Id. at 128-29, 654 S.E.2d at 912.
279. Id. at 131, 654 S.E.2d at 914.
280. Id. at 133, 654 S.E.2d at 914.
281. Id., 654 S.E.2d at 915.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 133-34, 654 S.E.2d at 915.
284. Id. at 134, 654 S.E.2d at 915.
285. Id. at 134-36, 654 S.E.2d at 915-16 (citing United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d
1038, 1040-42 (7th Cir. 2000)).
286. Id. at 137, 654 S.E.2d at 917.
287. Id. at 137-38, 654 S.E.2d at 917.
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A. Marital Privilege
In Carpenter v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged
with the rape of his stepdaughter. 288 At trial, the Commonwealth
introduced statements the defendant had made to his wife. 289 Af-
ter the defendant made the statements at issue, but before his
trial, the General Assembly amended the statute governing the
admissibility of husband/wife communications. 290 The amend-
ment provided that the privilege "'may not be asserted in any
proceeding in which ... either spouse is charged with a crime...
against the minor child of either spouse."' 291 On appeal, Carpen-
ter argued that using at trial the statements he made to his wife
violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Vir-
ginia Constitutions. 292 The court acknowledged that one way a
state can run afoul of the prohibitions against ex post facto laws
is when the state 'alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives
less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offence [sic], in order to convict the offend-
er."' 293 However, the change to the rules of evidence at issue here,
the court explained, did not lower the bar for the prosecution be-
cause the quantum of evidence needed for a conviction remained
the same. 294 Instead, the change in the law addressed the compe-
tency or admissibility of evidence, which does not fall within the
prohibition of the Ex Post Facto Clause.295
B. Medical Records
Hairston v. Commonwealth makes clear that counsel seeking
medical records from the victim of a crime must carefully follow
the requirements specified by statute. 296 The defendant, who was
288. 51 Va. App. 84, 87, 654 S.E.2d 345, 347 (Ct. App. 2007).
289. Id. at 89-90, 654 S.E.2d at 347-48,
290. Id. at 89, 654 S.E.2d at 348.
291. Id., 654 S.E.2d at 348 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-398 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp.
2008)).
292. Id. at 91, 654 S.E.2d at 348-49; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.3; VA. CONST.
art. I, § 9.
293. Carpenter, 51 Va. App. at 91, 654 S.E.2d at 349 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
386, 390 (1798)).
294. Id. at 93, 654 S.E.2d at 350.
295. Id. at 93-94, 654 S.E.2d at 350 (citing People v. Dolph-Hostetler, 664 N.W.2d 254,
258 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)).
296. 50 Va. App. 64, 68-70, 646 S.E.2d 32, 33-34 (Ct. App. 2007).
[Vol. 43:149
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
charged with a number of sex crimes, issued a subpoena for the
victim's counseling records. 297 The prosecution made a motion to
quash this subpoena, which the trial court granted.298 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld the decision of the trial
court, concluding that the subpoena did not comply with Virginia
Code section 32.1-127.1:03.299 The court first held that this sta-
tute creates a right of privacy in a patient's medical records.300
The court further held that the counseling records at issue were
covered by the plain language of the statute.301 Finally, the court
held that this statute applied to the records sought by the defense
in the case.30 2 The court then turned to whether the subpoena
complied with the strictures of Virginia Code section 32.1-
127.1:03. The court observed that although the subpoena com-
plied with Virginia Supreme Court Rule 3A:12(b), which general-
ly governs subpoenas in criminal cases, the subpoena for the
counseling records was inadequate to satisfy the requirements of
Virginia Code section 32.1-127.1:03.303 Specifically, the statute
requires (1) that a copy of the subpoena be provided to the non-
party witness; (2) that the moving party provide a notice to the
patient, informing the patient of the right to quash the subpoena;
and (3) that a notice be provided to the health care provider, stat-
ing that if the healthcare provider receives a motion to quash, or
the health care provider itself moves to quash the subpoena, the
documents must be provided under seal to the clerk of court. 304
Because the subpoena at issue did not satisfy any of these re-
quirements, the trial court properly quashed it.305 Finally, the
court concluded that the specific strictures of Virginia Code sec-
tion 32.1-127.1:03 controlled over the general provisions of Vir-
ginia Supreme Court Rule 3A:12.306
297. Id. at 66-67, 646 S.E.2d at 33.
298. Id. at 67-68, 646 S.E.2d at 33.
299. Id. at 68, 646 S.E.2d at 33.
300. Id., 646 S.E.2d at 33-34.
301. Id. at 70-71, 646 S.E.2d at 34-35.
302. Id. at 69, 646 S.E.2d at 34.
303. Id. at 69-70, 646 S.E.2d at 34-35.
304. Id. at 70, 646 S.E.2d at 34-35; see also VA. CODEANN. § 32.1-127.1:03 (Cum. Supp.
2008).
305. Hairston, 50 Va. App. at 70-71, 646 S.E.2d at 35.
306. See id. at 71-72, 646 S.E.2d at 35.
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C. Evidence of Other Crimes
The defendant in Scott v. Commonwealth objected to the joind-
er of nine robbery charges in a single trial.307 The prosecution
contended that the robberies were part of a "common scheme or
plan" under Virginia Rule 3A:6(b) and could, therefore, be tried
together. 308 The robberies shared the following similarities: (1)
each occurred between 10:00 p.m. and 12:30 a.m. in residential
areas; (2) the victims were all adults who were alone and either
stepping out of a vehicle or in a garage; (3) the robber made
threats and demanded personal property; (4) in five instances, the
robber demanded a personal identification number from the vic-
tim to gain access to a bank account; and (5) each robbery was
committed by a lone black male. 309 The Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia first noted that although it had not defined the term "common
scheme or plan" in the context of Rule 3A:6(b), this term had been
applied in discussing pattern offenses or modus operandi. 3 10 The
court held that "[t]he term 'common scheme' describes crimes that
share features idiosyncratic in character, which permit an infe-
rence that each individual offense was committed by the same
person or persons as part of a pattern of criminal activity involv-
ing certain identified crimes." 311 A "common plan," which is dis-
tinct from a "common scheme," "describes crimes that are related
to one another for the purpose of accomplishing a particular
goal." 312 The court concluded that the evidence did not support
either the existence of a "common scheme" or the presence of a
"common plan," but instead showed only "a general similarity of
manner" without any "idiosyncratic features."313 Therefore, the
court reversed and remanded the case. 314
In McGowan v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged
with distributing cocaine. 315 On March 4, 2004, a suspected drug
dealer was approached by a confidential informant who told the
307. 274 Va. 636, 639-40, 651 S.E.2d 630, 631-32 (2007).
308. Id. at 639, 651 S.E.2d at 631.
309. Id., 651 S.E.2d at 631-32.
310. Id. at 644-45, 651 S.E.2d at 635.
311. Id. at 645, 651 S.E.2d at 635.
312. Id. at 646, 651 S.E.2d at 635.
313. Id. at 646-47, 651 S.E.2d at 636.
314. Id. at 648, 651 S.E.2d at 636.
315. 274 Va. 689, 692, 652 S.E.2d 103, 104 (2007).
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suspected dealer that he wanted a "20 rock." 316 The suspected
drug dealer instructed the informant to follow her because her
'girl [was] across the street at McDonald's."'317 Once there, the
informant watched as the suspected dealer spoke with the defen-
dant, who then reached under her shirt and handed something to
the suspected drug dealer.318 The suspected drug dealer then ap-
proached the informant and handed him two rocks of cocaine in
exchange for twenty dollars. 319 McCowan was arrested several
months later and when she was searched, several pieces of co-
caine were recovered from her bra.320 At her trial, McGowan tes-
tified that she had no knowledge of the drug transaction of March
4th and denied any participation in the drug sale, instead stating
that she had removed money from her bra and given it to her
friend for the purpose of buying a meal at the McDonald's restau-
rant.321 During cross-examination-rather than on direct exami-
nation-McGowan said she "'wouldn't know crack cocaine if [she]
saw it."'322 Concluding that the defendant had "opened the door,"
the trial court permitted the prosecution to impeach McGowan
with the evidence recovered from the search of her person at the
time of her arrest. 32 3
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that it was error to allow
the prosecution to adduce this evidence. 324 In the court's view,
the fact that McGowan possessed cocaine several months later
"had little, if any, tendency to prove that McGowan had know-
ledge of cocaine on March 4, 2004."325 Because this evidence im-
plicated her in another crime and had little probative value, the
court concluded that its prejudice outweighed its probative val-
ue.326 Finally, the court held that although the prosecution had a
right to cross-examine McGowan, the prosecution "cannot be al-
lowed to essentially smuggle into evidence during its cross-
examination of a defendant proof of another crime not admissible
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 693, 652 S.E.2d at 104.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 696, 652 S.E.2d at 106.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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in its case-in-chief, which is not only highly inflammatory and
misleading to a jury, but lacking in serious probative value as
well." 32 7
D. Proving Predicate Crimes or Adjudications
Year after year, incomplete or missing documentation from
courts not of record has bedeviled prosecutors-and provided a
boon for defense attorneys-when prosecutors attempt to estab-
lish prior convictions or adjudications. In Perez v. Commonwealth,
police pulled over a car and discovered a gun under the driver's
seat.328 The defendant was charged with possession of a con-
cealed weapon and possession of a firearm after having been ad-
judicated delinquent of an offense that would have been a felony
if it had been committed by an adult.329 At trial, the prosecution
relied on three documents to establish the predicate crime: two
petitions purportedly from the Prince William County Juvenile
and Domestic Relations District Court, as well as a disposition
order from a juvenile court in Fairfax County. 330 The name and
the charges matched on all three documents, but only three of
four case numbers were the same. 331 The disposition order pro-
vided that the 'child has been found guilty of 2 counts-B&E +
Larceny"' and that the child had been 'committed to D.J.J."'332
The order adjudicating Perez specified that he was a "child" at
the time of the adjudication, and the documents referenced Pe-
rez's date of birth.333 The commitment order was signed but not
dated.334 The defendant asserted that '[a]n undated order pur-
porting to be a predicate juvenile adjudication is insufficient"' to
sustain the charges of felony possession of a firearm and of a con-
cealed firearm. 335 The Supreme Court of Virginia found that, un-
like prior cases where the fact or nature of the conviction was in
doubt, "the fact finder in this case did not need to engage in con-
jecture or surmise to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Perez
327. Id.
328. 274 Va. 724, 726, 652 S.E.2d 95, 95-96 (2007).
329. Id., 652 S.E.2d at 96.
330. Id. at 726-27, 652 S.E.2d at 96.
331. Id. at 727, 652 S.E.2d at 96.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 728, 652 S.E.2d at 97.
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was convicted of a felonious act prior to... the date of the posses-
sion offense charged."336 Therefore, the court held the jury could
find that these documents established the predicate offense.337
E. Scientific Evidence
With the growing use of science in the courtroom, courts have
fashioned rules to ensure its reliability. In Billips v. Common-
wealth, the defendant was convicted of sexual crimes against a
minor.338 At his sentencing proceeding, the Commonwealth ad-
duced evidence of a test based on a "penile plethysmograph," a
device "'designed to measure sexual responsiveness to a variety of
stimuli."' 339 The trial court overruled the defendant's objection
that the prosecution had failed to demonstrate the scientific re-
liability of this testing.340 The Court of Appeals of Virginia sus-
tained the admissibility of the evidence, reasoning that sentenc-
ing proceedings operated under relaxed standards of admissibility
of evidence. 341 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed this hold-
ing. 342 The court reasoned that judges, jurors, and lawyers gen-
erally lack knowledge about scientific advances and that laymen
often credit testimony that appears to be scientific.343 "That ten-
dency," the court noted, "has given rise to frequent complaints of
'junk science' in the courts."344 To combat this problem, courts
must make a 'threshold finding of fact with respect to the relia-
bility of the scientific method offered,"' subject to certain excep-
tions. 345 Moreover, the proponent of the scientific evidence bears
336. Id. at 730, 652 S.E.2d at 98.
337. Id.
338. 274 Va. 805, 807, 652 S.E.2d 99, 100 (2007).
339. Id. at 807-08, 652 S.E.2d at 100-01.
340. Id. at 808, 652 S.E.2d at 101.
341. Billips v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 278, 300, 307, 630 S.E.2d 340, 351, 355 (Ct.
App. 2006).
342. Billips, 274 Va. at 810, 652 S.E.2d at 102.
343. Id. at 809, 652 S.E.2d at 101-02.
344. Id., 652 S.E.2d at 102.
345. Id. at 809-10, 652 S.E.2d at 102 (quoting Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78,
97, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (1990)). Those exceptions include evidence that "is of a kind so fa-
miliar and accepted as to require no foundation to establish the fundamental reliability of
the system, such as fingerprint analysis; or unless it is so unreliable that the considera-
tions requiring its exclusion have ripened into rules of law, such as 'lie detector' tests; or
unless its admission is regulated by statute, such as blood-alcohol test results." Spencer,
240 Va. at 97, 393 S.E.2d at 621 (internal citations omitted).
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the burden of establishing its reliability.346 The court concluded
that the prosecution had not attempted to meet its burden in the
case at bar.347
V. SPECIFIC CRIMES
A. Aggravated Involuntary Manslaughter/Felony Homicide
In Payne v. Commonwealth, the defendant contended that her
convictions for both felony homicide and aggravated involuntary
manslaughter violated her protections against double jeopardy
because both convictions were predicated upon the death of a sin-
gle victim. 348 After a day of drinking on the job, the defendant
drove away from her employer's parking lot and promptly collided
with a car that was stopped at a red light.349 The defendant then
drove away, swerving erratically, and, within a short distance,
struck and killed a pedestrian and again drove away. 350 The
court employed the Blockburger test to determine whether the de-
fendant's convictions violated the constitutional protections
against double jeopardy. 351 The court considered the two offenses
in the abstract to assess whether each crime requires proof of a
fact that the other offense does not require.352 The court observed
that in this instance, each crime "requires proof of a fact which
the other does not."353 The felony homicide statute, "unlike the
aggravated involuntary manslaughter statute, requires proof that
the defendant was engaged in a felonious act at the time of the
unintended killing."354 Aggravated involuntary manslaughter,
"unlike the felony homicide statute, requires proof that the de-
fendant caused a death because she drove, while intoxicated, in a
manner so gross and culpable as to demonstrate a reckless disre-
346. Billips, 274 Va. at 810, 652 S.E.2d at 102.
347. Id.
348. 52 Va. App. 120, 122, 661 S.E.2d 513, 514 (Ct. App. 2008).
349. Id. at 123, 661 S.E.2d at 514.
350. Id. at 123-24, 661 S.E.2d at 514.
351. Id. at 126, 661 S.E.2d at 515 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
304 (1932)).
352. Id., 661 S.E.2d at 516.
353. Id. at 126-27, 661 S.E.2d at 516.
354. Id. at 127, 661 S.E.2d at 516.
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gard for human life."355 Therefore, the defendant was properly
convicted of two offenses, notwithstanding the fact that both
crimes involved a single victim. 356
B. Aggravated Sexual Battery
In DeArmond v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia addressed the "unit of prosecution" that the prosecution
must establish to sustain a conviction for aggravated sexual bat-
tery.357 The defendant had forced his granddaughter to touch his
penis after which she left his room to complete her homework. 358
When she returned to his room, he again placed her hand on his
penis and then touched her vagina and her chest.359 In the de-
fendant's view, these facts justified a single charge because they
were all a part of one continuous transaction. 360 His conviction on
multiple charges, he asserted, violated his rights under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.361 The key in determining the statutory
unit of prosecution, the court observed, is legislative intent. 362
Under Virginia law, a sexual battery has occurred when the de-
fendant "sexually abuses" the victim.363 Sexual abuse, in turn, is
defined as "'an act committed with the intent to sexually molest,
arouse, or gratify any person"' and includes situations where the
defendant touches the victim's "intimate parts."364 "Intimate
parts" are the "genitalia, anus, groin, breast, or buttocks of any
person."365 Construing these provisions together, the court found
that the Virginia Code "creates a unit of prosecution for every act
of sexual abuse and, at a minimum, contemplates separate acts
for each of the separate 'intimate parts' described in Code § 18.2-
67.10(2)."366 The court found that this construction was consis-
355. Id.
356. Id. at 129, 661 S.E.2d at 517.
357. 51 Va. App. 26, 32-33, 654 S.E.2d 317, 320 (Ct. App. 2007).
358. Id. at 30, 654 S.E.2d at 319.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 34, 654 S.E.2d at 321.
361. Id. at 32, 654 S.E.2d at 320; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
362. De'Armond, 51 Va. App. at 32-33, 654 S.E.2d at 320.
363. Id. at 33, 654 S.E.2d at 320 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.3(A)(1) (Repl. Vol.
2004 & Cum. Supp. 2008)).
364. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(6)(a) to -67.10(6)(d) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum.
Supp. 2008)).
365. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(2) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2008)).
366. Id.
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tent with the unit of prosecution in other sexual crime sta-
tutes.367 Finally, the court rejected the defendant's contention
that the rule of lenity favored a more narrow construction of the
statute, noting that the rule only applies to ambiguous sta-
tutes.368 The statute at issue was not ambiguous and, therefore,
did not call for the application of the rule of lenity.369
C. Brandishing a Firearm
In Huffman v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
examined whether, to be convicted of brandishing a gun, a defen-
dant must cause the victim to experience actual fear.370 The de-
fendant, who was in his girlfriend's yard, was intoxicated and yel-
ling at several individuals.371 The defendant pulled out a gun,
loaded it, and threatened to shoot a neighbor who had told him to
put the gun down.372 Based on these facts, the defendant was
convicted of brandishing a gun. 37 3 On appeal, the defendant con-
tended that the Commonwealth had not adduced any evidence
that his neighbor was actually placed in fear.374 Rejecting the ar-
gument, the court noted that the use of the term "fear" is mislead-
ing because the law does not require "that the victim be frigh-
tened; it is necessary merely that she be reasonably apprehensive
of injury."375 The court held that the victim showed apprehension
when she, too, asked the defendant to put away his gun.3 76 Final-
ly, the court held that the victim need not expressly- state that she
was fearful or apprehensive to establish this element of the of-
fense.377
367. Id. (citing Nelson v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 716, 740, 589 S.E.2d 23, 35 (Ct.
App. 2003); Carter v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 118, 128-29, 428 S.E.2d 34, 42 (Ct.
App. 1993)).
368. Id. at 34, 654 S.E.2d at 321.
369. Id. at 34-36, 654 S.E.2d at 321-22.
370. 51 Va. App. 469, 472-73, 658 S.E.2d 713, 714-15 (Ct. App. 2008).
371. Id. at 471, 658 S.E.2d at 713-14.
372. Id., 658 S.E.2d at 714.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 472, 658 S.E.2d at 714.
375. Id. at 473, 658 S.E.2d at 714 (quoting Seaton v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 739,
749, 595 S.E.2d 9, 14 (Ct. App. 2004)).
376. Id., 658 S.E.2d at 715.
377. See id.
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D. Burglary and Burglarious Tools
The defendant in Williams v. Commonwealth argued that a
plastic bag he had used to steal a pair of shoes did not qualify as
a "burglarious tool." 378 The Court of Appeals of Virginia agreed
and reversed his conviction for possession of burglarious tools. 379
The burglarious tools statute prohibits the possession of "any
tools, implements or outfit, with intent to commit burglary, rob-
bery or larceny."38 0 After examining several dictionary defini-
tions, the court concluded that an '"implement... in this context is
"a device, apparatus, instrument or equipment used in a trade,
vocation or profession, or an 'object used in performing an opera-
tion or carrying on work of any kind[, such as] an instrument or
apparatus necessary ... in the practice of [a] vocation or profes-
sion."' 38 1 Based on this definition, the court held, an ordinary
plastic bag does not qualify as an implement under the statute. 382
This conclusion, the court reasoned, was consistent with
precedent and legislative history and would avoid absurd re-
sults.383
E. Credit Card Fraud
The Court of Appeals of Virginia examined the scope of the cre-
dit card fraud statute in Saponaro v. Commonwealth.384 The de-
fendant's employer issued a credit card for employment-related
purchases to the defendant, who then incurred personal charges
amounting to several thousand dollars on the card.385 Under Vir-
ginia Code section 18.2-195, "[a] person is guilty of credit card
fraud when, with intent to defraud any person he ... [o]btains
money, goods, services or anything else of value by represent-
ing.., without the consent of the cardholder that he is the holder
of a specified card or credit card number."386 The "cardholder" is
378. 50 Va. App. 337, 340, 649 S.E.2d 717, 718 (Ct. App. 2007).
379. Id. at 339, 649 S.E.2d at 718.
380. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-94 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
381. Williams, 50 Va. App. at 342, 345, 649 S.E.2d at 721 (quoting THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2408 (1993)) (alteration in original).
382. Id. at 345, 649 S.E.2d at 721.
383. Id. at 345-47, 649 S.E.2d at 721-22.
384. 51 Va. App. 149, 655 S.E.2d 49 (Ct. App. 2008).
385. Id. at 150, 655 S.E.2d at 49.
386. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2.195 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
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"the person or organization named on the face of a credit card to
whom or for whose benefit the credit card is issued by an issu-
er."387 The court of appeals observed that the defendant unques-
tionably had the consent of the owner of the card, his employer, to
hold the card and that the statute did not restrict the use of a
card by one who had the consent of the cardholder to hold it.388
Because the defendant had lawful possession of the card, he could
not be convicted under the statute.389
F. Constructive Possession of Drugs
Although the cases in this area are legion, two recent decisions
from the Supreme Court of Virginia, reversing convictions for
constructive possession of drugs, demonstrate the obstacles pros-
ecutors face in proving these cases. In Young v. Commonwealth,
the defendant was stopped for a traffic violation.390 She coope-
rated during the stop and agreed to a search of the car, which
produced a prescription bottle with the name "Stephanie Woody"
on the label.391 Although the label described the contents of the
bottle as OxyContin, the bottle in fact contained morphine and
Trazodone. 392 At trial, Stephanie Woody testified that she lived
with her uncle, Andre Gatewood.393 Gatewood owned the car in
which the drugs were discovered and he was the boyfriend of the
defendant.394 Woody testified that the pills were hers, that she
had inadvertently left them in her uncle's car, and that the de-
fendant told her that she had the pills. 395 Woody also said that
she put different pills in one bottle, so she would not have to carry
several bottles. 396 The defense adduced evidence that Woody had
prescriptions for morphine, trazodone, and oxycodone. 397 The tri-
al court and the Court of Appeals of Virginia found the evidence
sufficient for a conviction.398 In particular, the court of appeals
387. Id. § 18.2-191 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
388. Saponaro, 51 Va. App. at 151, 655 S.E.2d at 50.
389. Id. at 152-53, 655 S.E.2d at 50-51.
390. 275 Va. 587, 589, 659 S.E.2d 308, 309 (2008).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 590, 659 S.E.2d at 309.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id., 659 S.E.2d at 309-10.
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drew the inference "that possession of a controlled drug gives rise
to an inference that the defendant was aware of its character."399
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed.400
The court stressed that "an essential element of the crime" of
possession of an illegal drug is "that the defendant intentionally
and consciously possessed it with knowledge of its nature and
character."401 The court noted that "[clountless scenarios can be
envisioned in which controlled substances may be found in the
possession of a person who is entirely unaware of their nature
and character."402 In the case at bar, the court concluded, "the
record is devoid of evidence of any acts, statements or conduct
tending to show guilty knowledge on her part."403 Because the
Commonwealth failed to prove the defendant knew of the nature
and character of the pills, the court reversed her conviction.404
In Maxwell v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
again reversed a conviction for constructive possession of
drugs.405 Around 11:00 a.m., a police officer approached the de-
fendant outside a shopping center and asked to speak with him in
connection with a check.406 The defendant's hands were placed
"down the front of his pants."407 Concerned for his safety, the of-
ficer asked the defendant to remove his hands, whereupon he re-
fused and ran away. 408 The officer gave chase and observed the
defendant emerge "from behind several stacks of plywood located
between [an] alley and a chain-link fence that enclosed [a] lumbe-
ryard."409 Eventually, the police brought in a drug dog, who
alerted on a lumber pallet.410 An officer reached in and found a
plastic bag that contained pieces of crack cocaine. 411 A fingerprint
was recovered from the baggie, but it did not match the defen-
399. Id., 659 S.E.2d at 310.
400. Id. at 593, 659 S.E.2d at 311.
401. Id. at 591, 659 S.E.2d at 310 (quoting Burton v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 711, 713,
213 S.E.2d 757, 759 (1975)).
402. Id. at 592, 659 S.E.2d at 310-11.
403. Id., 659 S.E.2d at 311.
404. Id. at 592-93, 659 S.E.2d at 311.
405. 275 Va. 437, 444, 657 S.E.2d 499, 503 (2008).
406. Id. at 440, 657 S.E.2d at 501.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
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dant's fingerprints.412 The court concluded this evidence was in-
sufficient to prove that the defendant possessed the recovered co-
caine. 413
The supreme court first noted that the officer's concern about
the defendant's hands in his pocket stemmed from a concern for
officer safety, not from the officer's belief that the defendant's
conduct signaled the presence of drugs.4 14 The court found that
the defendant's flight was suspicious, but may have been trig-
gered by the defendant's desire to avoid speaking with the police
about the check.415 The court also discounted testimony by em-
ployees of the lumberyard-that they had not seen anyone near
the pallet that morning-on the ground that these employees did
not keep a constant surveillance.416 Indeed, neither of the lumbe-
ryard employees had noticed the defendant.417 Moreover, the
plywood was located in an unfenced area and any pedestrian
could have readily placed the drugs there.418 Furthermore, the
court found it significant that when the defendant was observed
walking between the stacks of plywood and the fence, he did not
act furtively and did not appear to have anything in his hands.419
Finally, the court found that the fact that the defendant became
less talkative after he noticed the drugs were discovered was of
no consequence. 420 Two justices dissented from this holding.421
G. Driving Under the Influence/Unreasonable Refusal
By statute, a driver's license is administratively suspended for
sixty days when the driver's breath test shows a blood alcohol
concentration of .08 percent or more. 422 In Depsky v. Common-
wealth, the defendant argued that double jeopardy protections
precluded her conviction for driving under the influence because
412. Id. at 441, 657 S.E.2d at 502.
413. Id. at 443, 657 S.E.2d at 502-03.
414. Id., 657 S.E.2d at 503.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 444, 657 S.E.2d at 503.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 443, 657 S.E.2d at 503.
420. Id. at 443-44, 657 S.E.2d at 503.
421. Id. at 445, 657 S.E.2d at 504 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
422. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-391.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
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she had already been punished by the sixty-day suspension.423
The Court of Appeals of Virginia disagreed.424
The court relied on the framework articulated by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Hudson v. United States.425 First,
in determining whether a sanction is civil or criminal, courts
must look to how the legislature labeled the measure.426 If the
sanction is deemed a civil one, the court's inquiry ends unless a
defendant can establish that the measure is "so punitive in pur-
pose or effect" that it is in reality a criminal penalty.427 After
finding that the measure was civil, the court of appeals examined
the Hudson factors to determine whether the statute is in reality
a criminal punishment masquerading as a civil measure. 428
Those factors are:
(1) "whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of sciente"';
(4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pu-
nishment-retribution or deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it"; and
(7) "whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative pur-
pose assigned."4 2 9
Applying those factors to the administrative license suspen-
sion, the court concluded that "notwithstanding any incidental
punitive effect it may have, the sixty-day administrative suspen-
sion of a person's privilege to drive in Virginia pursuant to Code §
46.2-391.2 constitutes a civil sanction and, thus, does not offend
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy."430
The defendant in Brothers v. Commonwealth contended that
his refusal to take a breath test was not unreasonable because it
was based on his desire to first speak with an attorney.431 The
423. 50 Va. App. 454, 459, 650 S.E.2d 867, 870 (Ct. App. 2007).
424. Id. at 468, 650 S.E.2d at 874.
425. Id. at 460-61, 650 S.E.2d at 871 (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93
(1997)).
426. Id. (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99).
427. Id. at 461, 650 S.E.2d at 871 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99).
428. Id. at 464-66, 650 S.E.2d at 872-74.
429. Id. at 461, 650 S.E.2d at 871 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100).
430. Id. at 466-67, 650 S.E.2d at 874.
431. 50 Va. App. 468, 470, 650 S.E.2d 874, 875 (Ct. App. 2007).
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Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed his conviction for refusing
to take the test, concluding that the reasoning in Deaner v. Com-
monwealth disposed of this argument. 432 In Deaner, the court had
concluded that 'the consent to take a blood test is given when a
person operates a motor vehicle."'433 This consent is neither qual-
ified nor conditional.434 Furthermore, allowing a suspect to wait
for an attorney 'would virtually nullify the [i]mplied [c]onsent
[]aw."'4 35 The fact that Deaner was an administrative license
suspension, rather than a crime, did not diminish the force of the
holding.436 The narrow grounds that render a refusal "unreason-
able," such as when a blood withdrawal would endanger a per-
son's health, did not extend to a refusal conditioned on a suspect's
desire to first consult with counsel.437
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the defendant's con-
viction for driving under the influence of drugs in Jackson v.
Commonwealth.438 At the emergency room, the defendant re-
ceived a powerful narcotic drug.439 After he was discharged from
the emergency room, he crashed his vehicle into a telephone
pole.440 The defendant contended that he could not be charged
with driving under the influence of drugs because the drugs were
not "self-administered."441 Virginia Code section 18.2-266 prohi-
bits driving 'while... under the influence of any narcotic drug or
any other self-administered intoxicant or drug of whatsoever na-
ture."'442 Applying the canon that penal statutes must be strictly
construed, the court held that because the defendant's drug was
not "self-administered," his conviction must be vacated. 443 Future
cases will determine how broadly the court's conception of "self-
administered" will sweep.
432. Id. at 476-78, 650 S.E.2d at 878-79 (citing Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va.
285, 170 S.E.2d 199 (1969)).
433. Id. at 474, 650 S.E.2d at 877 (quoting Deaner, 210 Va. at 292, 170 S.E.2d at 204).
434. Id. (citing Deaner, 210 Va. at 292, 170 S.E.2d at 204).
435. Id. (quoting Deaner, 210 Va. at 293, 170 S.E.2d at 204) (alterations in original).
436. Id. at 476-77, 650 S.E.2d at 878-79.
437. Id. at 475-76, 650 S.E.2d at 878.
438. 274 Va. 630, 652 S.E.2d 111 (2007).
439. Id. at 632-33, 652 S.E.2d at 112.
440. Id. at 633, 652 S.E.2d at 112.
441. Id. at 633-34, 602 S.E.2d at 112-13.
442. Id. at 634, 652 S.E.2d at 113 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Cum. Supp.
2008)) (emphasis added).
443. Id. at 633-34, 652 S.E.2d at 113.
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In Brown-Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, the defendant was ar-
rested for driving under the influence.444 In transit to the deten-
tion center, she experienced difficulty breathing, which continued
upon arrival.445 She was offered and agreed to take a blood
test.446 At trial, she claimed that she should have been provided
with a breath test and the officer's failure to provide one denied
her the benefit of exculpatory evidence. 447 The Court of Appeals
of Virginia disagreed. The implied consent statute currently pro-
vides that a driver who operates a motor vehicle in Virginia
"'shall be deemed thereby, as a condition of such operation, to
have consented [upon arrest for driving under the influence] to
have samples of his blood, breath, or both blood and breath taken
for a chemical test to determine the alcohol. . . content of his
blood."'448 Furthermore, "'[a]ny person so arrested... shall sub-
mit to a breath test. If the breath test is unavailable or the person
is physically unable to submit to the breath test, a blood test shall
be given."'44 9 The court noted that although the arrested person
must submit to the breath test, the statute "does not impose any
obligation upon the police officer to offer a breath test."450 Indeed,
the officer need not offer any chemical testing at all.451 Examin-
ing the history of the statute, the court could not find any evi-
dence that the purpose of the statute was to benefit the arrested
driver.452 Accordingly, the court concluded that the defendant
"was never denied a statutorily mandated test."453
H. Felony Eluding
The felony eluding statute provides that a person is guilty of fe-
lony eluding if the person receives a visible or audible signal from
a law enforcement officer to stop the vehicle, but nevertheless
"drives such motor vehicle in a willful and wanton disregard of
444. 51 Va. App. 232, 234, 656 S.E.2d 422, 423 (Ct. App. 2008).
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 236, 656 S.E.2d at 424 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.2(A) (Cum. Supp.
2008)).
449. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 235-36, 656 S.E.2d at 423-24.
453. Id. at 237, 656 S.E.2d at 424.
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such signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of
the law-enforcement vehicle or endanger a person . . . ."454 In
Phelps v. Commonwealth, the defendant ignored a police officer's
signal to stop, sped away, and eventually crashed his car.455 He
was the sole occupant of the car.456 He argued that he could not
be convicted of felony eluding because he was the only person en-
dangered by his conduct.457 The Supreme Court of Virginia disa-
greed, concluding that "the term 'a person' means any individual
human being.., including the defendant."458 Had the General
Assembly wished to exclude the defendant from the plain mean-
ing of the statute, it would have done so.459 Therefore, he was
properly convicted because he endangered "a person"-himself.460
I. Sex Offender Registration
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected two constitutional chal-
lenges to registration requirements for the sex offender registry.
First, in McCabe v. Commonwealth, the defendant contended that
the General Assembly could not make her registration regime
more burdensome after she pled guilty to a charge that required
her to register as a sex offender.461 Initially, based on her convic-
tion for taking indecent liberties with a minor while in a custodial
or supervisory relationship, McCabe was classified as a "sex of-
fender."462 However, the General Assembly later changed the law
and classified this offense as a "sexually violent offense."463 The
change in classification imposed a more lengthy and onerous re-
registration burden on McCabe.464 McCabe initiated litigation to
challenge her reclassification, arguing that it violated her subs-
tantive due process and equal protection rights.465 The Supreme
Court of Virginia first concluded that McCabe had failed to dem-
454. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-817(B) (Cum. Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
455. 275 Va. 139, 141, 654 S.E.2d 926, 927 (2008).
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 142, 654 S.E.2d at 927.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 143, 654 S.E.2d at 928.
461. See 274 Va. 558, 562, 650 S.E.2d 508, 510 (2007).
462. Id. at 561, 650 S.E.2d at 510.
463. Id.; see Act of Apr. 5, 2001, ch. 840, 2001 Acts 1186 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 9.1-902(E) (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
464. McCabe, 274 Va. at 561, 650 S.E.2d at 510.
465. Id. at 561-62, 650 S.E.2d at 510.
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onstrate that the registration requirement infringed on a funda-
mental right.466 Indeed, the court found "[tlo the contrary ... li-
berty rights of convicted felons may be curtailed more than those
of the general populace."467 Furthermore, McCabe did not chal-
lenge the registration requirement on the basis that it failed "ra-
tional basis" scrutiny. 468
Finally, McCabe contended that her procedural due process
rights were infringed because she was not provided with a hear-
ing to establish that she did not present a danger to the public. 469
The court rejected this contention, noting that the reclassification
"of a crime as a 'sexually violent offense' . . . is based solely on the
nature of the crime, not on a determination of current dangerous-
ness."470 Therefore, the court concluded, "no process is necessary
to prove a fact not material to the classification determina-
tion."471
In Morency v. Commonwealth,472 the petitioner brought a dif-
ferent challenge to his registration requirement. Morency was
convicted of aggravated sexual battery and was required to regis-
ter as a sex offender and to re-register with the state police every
ninety days for life.473 In 2002, Morency filed a petition in the cir-
cuit court to obtain relief from the quarterly registration re-
quirement, which was granted.474 The order granting the petition
specified that the clerk should notify the state police to remove
Morency's name and information from the website maintained by
the state police.475 In 2006, the provision requiring removal of an
officer's information from the Internet registry was removed.476
The state police then notified Morency that the amendment ap-
plied retroactively, and that Morency's information would, there-
fore, be reposted on the registry.477 Relying on Virginia Code sec-
tion 1-239, Morency argued that this change infringed on a vested
466. Id. at 565, 650 S.E.2d at 512.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 566, 650 S.E.2d at 513.
469. Id. at 566-67, 650 S.E.2d at 513.
470. Id. at 567, 650 S.E.2d at 513.
471. Id.
472. 274 Va. 569, 649 S.E.2d 682 (2007).
473. Id. at 572, 649 S.E.2d at 683.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
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right he had acquired based on the judgment order that removed
him from the website. 478
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that "once a plaintiff ac-
quires ... a vested right, it cannot be disturbed by the subse-
quent repeal of the statute under which it was obtained."479 Al-
though "a final judgment order may vest a litigant with an
accrued right for purposes of Code § 1-239," the specific nature of
the "right" at issue must be determined. 480 Analyzing the statu-
tory right at issue, the court found that under Virginia Code sec-
tion 9.1-909(A), the petitioner could obtain an order that relieved
him of the obligation to reregister quarterly.481 The statute did
not authorize a circuit court to direct the state police to remove
the petitioner's information from the Internet.482 The duty of the
state police to remove a petitioner's information from the website
was self-executing.483 Because of the manner in which the statute
operated, the court concluded that the order of the trial court di-
recting the state police to remove Morency from the website did
not create a vested or substantive right so that Morency could
prevent his information from being posted on the Internet.484 In-
stead, the removal of his information from the Internet registry
''was solely an action directed by statute by virtue of the receipt of
the September 30, 2004 order."485 Accordingly, the legislature
could alter the regime "at will." 486 Justice Koontz, joined by Chief
Justice Hassell, dissented.487
J. Solicitation To Commit Murder and Attempted Murder
The defendant in Ostrander v. Commonwealth, was convicted
of both solicitation to commit murder and attempted capital mur-
der for hire.488 Ostrander had entered a guilty plea to the charge
of solicitation and contended that the Double Jeopardy Clause
478. Id. at 573, 649 S.E.2d at 683.
479. Id. at 574, 649 S.E.2d at 684.
480. Id. at 574-75, 649 S.E.2d at 684.
481. Id. at 576, 649 S.E.2d at 685.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 577, 649 S.E.2d at 686.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Id. (Koontz, J., dissenting).
488. 51 Va. App. 386, 391, 658 S.E.2d 346, 348 (Ct. App. 2008).
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precluded a subsequent prosecution for attempted capital mur-
der. 489 The Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that double
jeopardy imposed no bar to convict for attempted capital mur-
der.490 The court first rejected the argument that the defendant's
guilty plea, followed by a trial on the remaining charge, consti-
tuted separate prosecutions for the "same offense."491 Relying on
settled precedent, the court concluded that "a defendant's election
to plead guilty at trial to one charge and not guilty to another
charge arising from the same criminal act 'neither transform[s]
the single prosecution into two separate prosecutions nor cap-
ture[s] for [the defendant] any special protections against succes-
sive prosecutions under the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause."'492 The
court then turned to whether the defendant was twice subjected
to prosecution for the same offense. The test is "'whether each [of-
fense] requires proof of a fact which the other does not."' 493 This
test considers the elements of the two offenses "in the abstract,
rather than in the context of the facts of the particular case being
reviewed."494
As the defendant conceded, "[T]he offense of attempted capital
murder for hire requires proof of a fact that the offense of solicita-
tion to commit murder does not-namely, that the accused per-
formed a direct act toward the commission of the contemplated
murder."495 The attempted capital murder statute contains two
distinct provisions. It "allows an accused to be convicted of capital
murder for hire if he either hires someone to do the killing ... or
does the killing himself after having been hired by someone else
to do it."496 In the second scenario, where the hired killer com-
mits the murder, the killer clearly could not be convicted of solici-
tation. 497 Therefore, "when considered in the abstract without
reference to the particular facts, a solicitation to commit murder
conviction requires proof of a fact that an attempted capital mur-
489. Id.
490. Id. at 394, 658 S.E.2d at 349-50.
491. Id. at 392-93, 658 S.E.2d at 349.
492. Id. at 393, 658 S.E.2d at 349 (citing Rea v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 940, 944,
421 S.E.2d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 1992)) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
493. Id. at 395, 658 S.E.2d at 350 (citing West v. Dir. of Dep't of Corr., 273 Va. 56, 63,
639 S.E.2d 190, 195 (2007)).
494. Id. at 396, 658 S.E.2d at 350 (citing West, 273 Va. at 63, 639 S.E.2d at 195).
495. Id., 658 S.E.2d at 351.
496. Id. at 397, 658 S.E.2d at 351 (citations omitted).
497. Id.
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der for hire conviction does not-namely, that the accused soli-
cited another person to commit a murder." 498 Consequently, the
court held, the two offenses are not the "same offense," and the
defendant suffered no deprivation of his protection against double
jeopardy.499
K. Failure To Appear
The defendant in Bowling v. Commonwealth pled guilty to
charges of driving while intoxicated and possession of marijuana
with the intent to distribute.500 After failing to appear for his
sentencing proceeding, he later turned himself in and was con-
victed of failing to appear.501 The defendant observed that the
failure-to-appear statute criminalized a willful failure to appear
for persons who are "charged" with a felony. 502 Because he
pleaded guilty, he contended, he was no longer "charged" with a
felony but rather was "convicted" of a felony.503 The Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia disagreed, reasoning that the defendant's guilty
plea did not alter the fact that he remained charged with a
crime. 504 The court also rejected the defendant's interpretation on
the ground that it would lead to absurd results.505
L. Felony Escape
The sufficiency of the evidence for a felony-escape charge was
at issue in Hubbard v. Commonwealth.506 The defendant, seeking
to avoid a traffic stop, engaged in a high speed pursuit with the
police and eventually fled on foot.507 A fight ensued between
Hubbard and the police officer, who briefly managed to subdue
the defendant before he escaped. 508 Hubbard was charged with,
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. 51 Va. App. 102, 104, 654 S.E.2d 354, 355 (Ct. App. 2007).
501. Id. at 104-05, 654 S.E.2d at 355.
502. Id. at 107-08, 654 S.E.2d at 357; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-128(B) (Repl. Vol.
2008).
503. Bowling, 51 Va. App. at 107-08, 654 S.E.2d at 357.
504. Id. at 108, 654 S.E.2d at 357.
505. Id. at 110, 654 S.E.2d at 358.
506. 276 Va. 292, 293, 661 S.E.2d 464, 465 (2008).
507. Id. at 294, 661 S.E.2d at 465-66.
508. Id., 661 S.E.2d at 466.
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and convicted of, felonious escape from custody.509 The Supreme
Court of Virginia reversed this conviction.51o The statute provides
that "if any person lawfully in the custody of any police officer on
a charge of criminal offense escapes from such custody by force or
violence, he shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony."511 The court ob-
served that the Commonwealth must prove as an element of this
offense that the defendant was charged with a criminal offense
before the escape occurred.51 2 The court concluded that the evi-
dence was insufficient because no criminal charge was pending at
the time of the defendant's flight from the police. 51 3 Probable
cause to arrest for an offense, the court held, is not the same as a
criminal charge.514 Instead, a charge is a "formal accusation" or a
"formal written complaint" of a crime.51 5 The Commonwealth had
presented no evidence of a criminal charge and, therefore, the
evidence failed to establish this element of the offense.516
M. Felony Murder-Arson
In Kennemore v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged
with felony murder based on evidence that linked him to the
charred remains of a woman. 51 7 The evidence did not conclusively
show whether the victim had died before or after the fire.518
When the jury inquired whether the victim had to be alive at the
time of the fire, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: "In
the commission of arson as used in these instructions means a
killing before, during or after arson or attempted arson where the
killing is so closely related to the arson in time, place, and causal
connection as to make it part of the same criminal enterprise."519
In the defendant's view, this instruction was incorrect and
should have instead stated that the killing must be "while the [de-
509. Id.
510. Id. at 296-97, 661 S.E.2d at 467.
511. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-478 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
512. Hubbard, 276 Va. at 295, 661 S.E.2d at 466.
513. Id. at 296, 661 S.E.2d at 467.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. 50 Va. App. 703, 705, 653 S.E.2d 606, 607 (Ct. App. 2007).
518. Id. at 706, 653 S.E.2d at 607.
519. Id.
20081
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
fendant] was engaged in the arson."520 In resolving this question,
the Court of Appeals of Virginia first cautioned against equating
a jury question with a jury finding of any kind.521 The court next
held that under the res gestae limitation on the felony- murder
doctrine, a killing falls under the felony-murder doctrine if it 'is
so closely related to the felony in time, place, and causal connec-
tion as to make it a part of the same criminal enterprise."' 522
Where the felony and the killing are "inextricably interwoven ...
it does not matter whether the killing precedes the felony or fol-
lows it."523 Therefore, the trial court's instruction to the jury
"fairly restated the governing principles of the res gestae limita-
tion on the felony-murder doctrine."524
N. Fortified Drug House
In Jones v. Commonwealth, a case of first impression, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia addressed the prohibition on a "fortified
drug house."525 Police obtained a warrant to search a house
where drug transactions occurred and, as police approached, the
defendant and another individual pushed a stove against the rear
door of the house.526 To steady the stove, they also placed a board
between the stove and a stairway. 527 After police officers battered
down the door to gain entry, they also noticed a screwdriver
placed in the latch of the door.528 The defendant maintained that
this evidence did not demonstrate that he had "substantially al-
tered [the house] from its original status" and, therefore, the evi-
dence against him was insufficient.529 Giving this phrase its or-
dinary meaning, the court held that the measures taken by the
defendant did not constitute a "substantial modification" of the
structure. 530 Moving personal property within the house, the
520. Id. at 708, 653 S.E.2d at 608.
521. Id. at 709, 653 S.E.2d at 609.
522. Id. at 710, 653 S.E.2d at 609 (quoting Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033,
1043-44, 243 S.E.2d 477, 483 (1978)).
523. Id. (citing Haskell, 218 Va. at 1041-43, 243 S.E.2d at 482-83).
524. Id. at 711, 653 S.E.2d at 610.
525. 276 Va. 121, 123, 661 S.E.2d 412, 413 (2008).
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id., 661 S.E.2d at 413-14; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-258.02 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
530. Jones, 276 Va. at 125, 661 S.E.2d at 414-15.
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court concluded, does not alter the house's original status.531 Fi-
nally, the court declined to set forth a comprehensive definition of
the phrase "substantially altered from its original status." In-
stead, the court held, each case will turn on its own facts. 532
0. Habitual Offender
Changes made in 1999 to the habitual offender regime left in-
tact the criminal provision that prohibited persons who had been
previously declared habitual offenders from driving.533 In Lilly v.
Commonwealth, the defendant, who had been adjudicated a habi-
tual offender before 1999, contended that this partial repeal vi-
olated her rights under the Equal Protection and the Due Process
Clauses of the United States and Virginia Constitutions.534 The
defendant noted that the changes to the law placed recidivist
drivers into two categories: first, persons declared habitual of-
fenders before July 1, 1999, who faced certain criminal penalties
for driving as habitual offenders; and second, persons who com-
mitted certain offenses after July 1, 1999, who faced a separate
set of specific penalties. 535 The defendant contended that identi-
cally situated persons would be treated differently.536
The Court of Appeals of Virginia found the statute "free of any
constitutional infirmity."537 The classification at issue, the court
noted, did not involve a fundamental right or a suspect class. 538
In such cases, the law benefits from "a strong presumption of va-
lidity" and will be sustained upon a showing that "'a rational rela-
tionship exists between the disparity of treatment and some legi-
timate governmental purpose."' 539 The court held that the
legislative change at issue served several rational goals. First, the
General Assembly could rationally choose to "balance[ ] the need
to reform the cumbersome civil administrative process of declar-
ing a driver to be an habitual offender with the corresponding
531. Id.
532. Id., 661 S.E.2d at 415.
533. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 173, 180, 647 S.E.2d 517, 520 (Ct. App. 2007).
534. Id. at 178, 181, 647 S.E.2d at 520-21; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
535. Lilly, 50 Va. App. at 181, 647 S.E.2d at 521.
536. Id. at 183, 647 S.E.2d at 522.
537. Id. at 182, 647 S.E.2d at 522.
538. Id. at 181, 647 S.E.2d at 521.
539. Id. at 181-82, 647 S.E.2d at 521 (quoting Gray v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 290,
308, 645 S.E.2d 448, 459 (2007)).
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need to retain the benefits of the old system."540 This strategy al-
so allowed for "more tightly calibrated future recidivism punish-
ments to underlying offenses."541 Furthermore, the change
avoided any ex post facto concerns that might arise if persons
classified before 1999 were subjected to a different range of pu-
nishments that existed under the prior law.542 The fact that these
changes may cause certain individuals to face differing punish-
ments based on the same set of facts did not render the action of
the General Assembly irrational.543 The court also held that the
corresponding provisions of the Virginia constitution did not go
any further than the federal protections and, therefore, the out-
come was the same as to those provisions.544 In a similar vein,
the court concluded that the law satisfied the rational basis scru-
tiny required for challenges under the prohibition on "special,
private, or local law[s]" found in the Constitution of Virginia. 545
Finally, the court held that the defendant did not have any
right to advise the jury during the guilt phase of the trial about
the mandatory minimum sentence she faced if convicted.546 The
court of appeals observed that courts have "reject[ed] efforts by
both prosecutors and defense counsel to inject issues of punish-
ment into the guilt phase of a jury trial."547
P. Disorderly Conduct
The Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed the scope of a spe-
cific limitation for disorderly conduct prosecutions in Battle v.
Commonwealth.548 A defendant cannot be prosecuted for disor-
derly conduct where his conduct is "'otherwise made punishable"'
under title 18.2.549 This phrase, the court concluded, does not
preclude a conviction for disorderly conduct merely because a de-
540. Id. at 183, 647 S.E.2d at 522.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 184, 647 S.E.2d at 522 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485
(1970)).
544. Id., 647 S.E.2d at 522-23.
545. Id. at 184-85, 647 S.E.2d at 523; see Va. CONST. art. IV, §§ 14-15.
546. Lilly, 50 Va. App. at 185, 647 S.E.2d at 523.
547. Id. at 186, 647 S.E.2d at 524.
548. 50 Va. App. 135, 137-38, 647 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ct. App. 2007).
549. Id. at 140, 647 S.E.2d at 501 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415) (Cum. Supp.
2008).
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fendant could be prosecuted for another criminal offense; rather,
it applies to "Title 18.2 crimes for which the defendant could be
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."550
The court then applied this principle to the facts before it. A po-
lice officer noticed the defendant engaged in a loud argument af-
ter he was escorted out of a nightclub.551 The officer could see the
defendant making a "striking motion" towards another individu-
al, but the officer could not see if the blow had landed.552 When
the officer asked the defendant to move from the sidewalk to
avoid obstructing the passage of those who wished to enter the
club, the defendant vehemently cursed at the officer.553 The court
first observed that the assault could not qualify as disorderly
conduct because that conduct was otherwise made punishable by
the assault and battery statute.554 Similarly, the fact that the de-
fendant cursed at the officer was punishable, if at all, as fighting
words under Virginia Code section 18.2-416.555 Finally, the de-
fendant's failure to move from the sidewalk was punishable under
Virginia Code section 18.2-404.556 Therefore, because the defen-
dant's actions were otherwise punishable, he could not be con-
victed of disorderly conduct.557
Q. Rape
In Velasquez v. Commonwealth, the defendant, who was on tri-
al for charges of burglary and rape, took issue with a jury instruc-
tion providing that "[i]n the absence of evidence showing a con-
trary intent, you may infer that a defendant's unauthorized
presence in a building of another was with the intent to commit
rape."558 In a prior burglary case, Tompkins v. Commonwealth,
the Supreme Court of Virginia had approved an instruction stat-
ing that "when the Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasona-
550. Id.
551. Id. at 137, 647 S.E.2d at 500.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Id. at 141, 647 S.E.2d at 502.
555. Id.
556. Id. This statute criminalizes the obstruction of the free passage of others who are
coming and going in a public place in the face of a request by an officer to move. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-404 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
557. Battle, 50 Va. App. at 142, 647 S.E.2d at 502.
558. 276 Va. 326, 328 & n.1, 661 S.E.2d 454, 455 & n.1 (2008).
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ble doubt that the defendant made an unlawful entry into a dwel-
ling house in the night time, the presumption is that the entry
was made for an unlawful purpose and the purpose may be in-
ferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances"559
The court affirmed the validity of the Tompkins instruction in
the context of a burglary charge, but distinguished its application
to the specific intent crime of burglary from the general intent
crime of rape. 560 The court reasoned that burglary is a specific in-
tent crime, and it is appropriate to instruct the jury according-
ly.561 In contrast, rape, a general intent crime, is proved when the
prosecution shows that the defendant knowingly and intentional-
ly committed the acts that constitute rape.562 Although the in-
struction was provided in reference to the burglary charge, the
court observed, the instruction had a "collateral effect" on the
rape charge and "amounted to an improper comment on the evi-
dence."563 The court also concluded that the instruction was le-
gally erroneous. 564 The Tompkins instruction, the court noted,
left for the jury the determination of what intent the defendant
harbored.565 Here, the instruction improperly suggested to the
jury what conclusion it should draw from the facts in evidence. 566
The court further concluded, however, that the error was harm-
less because of the overwhelming evidence against the defen-
dant.567
R. Weapons Offenses
Virginia law continues its realignment following the Supreme
Court of Virginia's decision in Farrakhan v. Commonwealth.568 In
that case, the court held that not just any item would qualify as a
"weapon of like kind" under Virginia Code section 18.2-308(A).569
559. 212 Va. 460, 461, 184 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1971).
560. Velasquez, 276 Va. at 329, 661 S.E.2d at 456.
561. Id.
562. Id. at 329-30, 661 S.E.2d at 456 (citing Commonwealth v. Minor, 267 Va. 166,
173, 591 S.E.2d 61, 66 (2004)).
563. Id. at 330, 661 S.E.2d at 456.
564. Id.
565. Id., 661 S.E.2d at 456-57.
566. Id., 661 S.E.2d at 456.
567. Id. at 330-31, 661 S.E.2d at 457.
568. 273 Va. 177, 639 S.E.2d 227 (2007).
569. Id. at 182, 639 S.E.2d at 230; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
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The item in question must be a "weapon."570 If the item qualifies
as a weapon, it must also constitute a weapon that shares charac-
teristics with the list of weapons enumerated in the statute.571
In Harris v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia ex-
amined whether a box cutter fell within the sweep of proscribed
items or as a "weapon of like kind" under Virginia law. 572 The
Commonwealth argued that a box cutter is analogous to a razor,
one of the items listed in the statute.573 The court rejected the
comparison, finding that a box cutter differs from a razor. 574
Strictly construing the statute, the court found that a box cutter
is an implement designed to open boxes, and is not a weapon. 575
In reaching this conclusion, the court overruled a decision from
the Court of Appeals of Virginia to the extent it reached a differ-
ing conclusion. 576 The supreme court acknowledged that box cut-
ters can be dangerous, but considered itself bound by the limits of
the statute.577
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed a different aspect of
the prohibition on carrying a concealed weapon in Pruitt v. Com-
monwealth.578 In that case, the trial court accepted the defen-
dant's testimony that, following a collision, he placed his gun in
the center console of his car.579 Previously, the pistol had been in
plain view on the front seat. 580 When the police arrived at the
scene, Pruitt was standing outside of his vehicle, the windows of
the car were rolled up, and the doors were closed.581 The defen-
dant was charged and convicted for possessing a concealed wea-
570. Farrakhan, 273 Va. at 182, 639 S.E.2d at 230.
571. Id.
572. 274 Va. 409, 413, 650 S.E.2d 89, 90 (2007). Code section § 8.2-308.2(A) makes it
unlawful for a convicted felon "to knowingly and intentionally carry ... any weapon de-
scribed in" § 18.2-308(A). VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
Section 18.2-308(A) proscribes listed weapons and "any weapon of like kind." Id. § 18.2-
308(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
573. Harris, 274 Va. at 413-14, 650 S.E.2d at 91; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308(A)
(Cum. Supp. 2008).
574. Harris, 274 Va. at 414-15, 650 S.E.2d at 91.
575. Id. at 415, 650 S.E.2d at 91-92.
576. Id., 650 S.E.2d at 91 (overruling O'Banion v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 47, 59,
531 S.E.2d 599, 605 (Ct. App. 2000)).
577. Id., 650 S.E.2d at 92.
578. 274 Va. 382, 650 S.E.2d 684 (2007).
579. Id. at 384-85, 650 S.E.2d at 684-85.
580. Id. at 384, 650 S.E.2d at 684.
581. Id. at 385, 650 S.E.2d at 685.
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pon.582 The statute in question, Virginia Code section 18.2-
308(A), prohibits a person from "carr[ying] about his person, hid-
den from common observation ... any pistol."583 Pruitt argued
that he was not carrying a pistol "about his person." 584 The court
agreed, holding that "[t]here simply is no evidence demonstrating
that Pruitt remained in the vehicle for any appreciable length of
time beyond that necessary to place his pistol in the console com-
partment."85 The danger contemplated by the statute-the risk
of "prompt and immediate use" of the weapon-was simply not
present. 586 Thus, although the pistol was concealed, it was not
about the defendant's person and the court reversed his convic-
tion. 587 The decision in Pruitt is based on unusual facts. Never-
theless, the decision could prove helpful to a defendant who faces
a similar situation.
S. Welfare Fraud
In Burrell v. Commonwealth, the defendant challenged her
conviction for making a false application for welfare.588 In her
application for food stamps, she had stated that she and her five
children resided in Isle of Wight County.589 Based on this infor-
mation, she received over $3000 in welfare benefits.590 The
Commonwealth learned that the defendant, in fact, resided in
Newport News.591 Drawing from the perjury statute, Burrell ar-
gued that not just any false statement would suffice for a convic-
tion, but, rather, only a "material" one. 592
The Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected the defendant's ar-
gument based on the plain language of the statute. Unlike the
perjury statute, the statute criminalizing a false statement on a
welfare application prohibits the falsification of 'any matter or
582. Id. at 386, 650 S.E.2d at 685.
583. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
584. Pruitt, 274 Va. at 386-87, 650 S.E.2d at 686.
585. Id. at 388, 650 S.E.2d at 687.
586. Id. at 389, 650 S.E.2d at 687.
587. Id.
588. 50 Va. App. 72, 76, 646 S.E.2d 35, 37 (Ct. App. 2007).
589. Id. at 76-77, 646 S.E.2d at 38.
590. Id. at 78, 646 S.E.2d at 38.
591. Id. at 78-80, 646 S.E.2d at 38-39.
592. Id. at 80-81, 646 S.E.2d at 39-40.
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thing required by the provisions of this title."'593 The court fur-
ther held that the defendant's address was required to obtain wel-
fare benefits, and, therefore, the defendant was properly con-
victed of making a false statement related to a matter "required
by" the statute.594 Finally, the court concluded that the defendant
was properly convicted of welfare fraud.595 The defendant as-
serted that she was eligible for food stamps due to her financial
situation, and the fact that the application was processed in the
wrong locality was of no moment. 596 The court observed that each
locality appropriates funds for public assistance and for the ad-
ministrative costs of providing assistance.597 Because of this, the
court held, the appellant "was not 'entitled' to food stamps from
Isle of Wight County; the fact that she may have been entitled to
food stamps in a different locality is immaterial to the present of-
fense."598
VI. LEGISLATION
In the criminal area, the Virginia General Assembly continued
the past trend from recent sessions by enacting legislation that
focuses on sexual crimes against children.
A. Sex Crimes
It is now a Class 1 misdemeanor for persons eighteen years or
older to, with lascivious intent, "kiss[ ] a child under the age of 13
on the mouth while knowingly and intentionally penetrating the
mouth of such child with his tongue."599 A conviction for this of-
fense triggers registration as a sex offender.600
After July 1, 2008, persons convicted of an "offense prohibiting
proximity to children" are now proscribed as a part of their sen-
tence from "going for the purpose of having any contact what-
soever with children that are not in his custody, within 100 feet of
593. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-502 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2008)).
594. Id. at 81-82, 646 S.E.2d at 40.
595. Id. at 83, 646 S.E.2d at 41.
596. Id. at 82, 646 S.E.2d at 40.
597. Id. at 83, 646 S.E.2d at 41.
598. Id.
599. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.6 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
600. Id. § 9.1-902-(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
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the premises of any place owned or operated by a locality that he
knows or should know is a playground, athletic field or facility, or
gymnasium."601 This measure expands the scope of the existing
prohibition on proximity to children.602
Police and prosecutors are now barred from requiring the vic-
tim of a sex crime to submit to a polygraph examination "or other
truth-telling device" as a condition to proceed with an investiga-
tion of the offense.603
Defendants charged with certain sex crimes involving minors
can no longer marry their way out of a conviction.604 That "safe
harbor" has been repealed.605
The General Assembly has enacted a fairly narrow residency
prohibition for certain sex crime convicts. Persons convicted after
July 1, 2008 of raping a child under the age of thirteen, forcible
sodomy of a child under the age of thirteen, or animate or inani-
mate object penetration of a child under the age of thirteen, if the
offense is committed in conjunction with an abduction, burglary
or a malicious wounding, are forbidden from residing within 500
feet of a specified public park.606 The park must be owned and
operated by a county, city, or town, share a boundary with a pri-
mary, secondary, or high school, and the park must be regularly
used for school activities. 607 Violating this statute constitutes a
Class 6 felony.608
Under previously existing law, persons convicted of a sexually
violent offense were prohibited from entering and being present
on school grounds during school hours. 609 As of 2008, this prohi-
bition has been extended to a prohibition on presence during
601. Id. § 18.2-370.2 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
602. See id.
603. Id. § 19.2-9.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
604. Code section 18.2-66 previously made a defendant immune from prosecution if he
had subsequently married the victim of certain sex crimes. The victim also must have con-
sented and been over fourteen years old. Id. § 18.2-66 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
605. Act of Mar. 3, 2008, ch. 174, 2008 Va. Acts - (repealing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-66
(Cum. Supp. 2008)).
606. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 2008); see id.§ 18.2-61(A) (Cum. Supp.
2008) (rape); id. § 18.2-67.1(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2008) (forcible sodomy); id. § 18.2-67.2(A)(1)
(Cum. Supp. 2008) (object sexual penetration).
607. Id. § 18.2-370.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
608. Id.
609. Id. § 18.2-370.5 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
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school-related and school-sponsored activities.610 Therefore, such
convicts should avoid athletic contests or practices that take place
on school grounds.
B. Animal Fighting
In 2008, the General Assembly significantly increased the pe-
nalties associated with animal fighting.611 Among other meas-
ures, aiding and abetting an animal fight, or even attending one,
can constitute a Class 6 felony.6 12
C. Civil Remedial Fees
The General Assembly, bowing to strong public pressure, re-
pealed the despised civil remedial fees imposed upon conviction
for certain traffic-related crimes.613
D. Credit Card Offenses
A prosecution for credit card offenses is now proper in any city
or county where a credit card number is used, attempted to be
used, or possessed with the intent to commit credit card forgery
or fraud.614 This change nullifies the outcome in Meeks v. Com-
monwealth.615
E. Jury Confidentiality
In a measure that essentially codifies existing practice, the
General Assembly has expressly authorized a court to enter an
order, on its own motion or upon a motion by one of the parties,
610. Id. § 18.2-370.5 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
611. Act of Mar. 11, 2008, ch. 543, 2008 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 3.1-796.124 (Repl. Vol. 2008)); Act of Mar. 27, 2008, ch. 707, 2008 Va. Acts - (codi-
fied as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.124) (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
612. VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.124 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
613. Act of Mar. 27, 2008, ch. 656, 2008 Va. Acts - (repealing VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-
206.1 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
614. Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 797, 2008 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-198.1 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
615. 274 Va. 798, 803-04, 651 S.E.2d 637, 640 (2007) (overturning conviction for credit-
card theft based on incorrect venue).
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for good cause shown, limiting the disclosure of jurors' personal
information to anyone other than the attorneys for the parties.616
F. Firearms
Under prior law, a juvenile who was adjudicated delinquent of
certain offenses after July 1, 2005 could not possess a firearm.617
The General Assembly deleted this time limitation.6 18 Therefore,
juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent of the specified
offenses at any time are now prohibited from possessing a fire-
arm. 619
G. Illegal Aliens
The General Assembly established a presumption that illegal
aliens charged with certain crimes are ineligible for bail.620 One
significant limitation on this measure is for misdemeanors and
crimes involving illegal drugs. In those cases, the presumption
does not apply unless (1) "the United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement has guaranteed that, in all such cases in
the Commonwealth, it will issue a detainer for the initiation of
removal proceedings"; and (2) further agrees to reimburse the lo-
cality for the cost of incarceration from the time of the issuance of
the detainer.62 1
It is now a Class 6 felony to sell a firearm to a person who is
not lawfully present in the United States.622
H. Underage DUI
The General Assembly changed the punishment for underage
drinking and driving.623 The offense is now a Class 1 misdemea-
616. Act of Mar. 11, 2008, ch. 538, 2008 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
263.3 (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
617. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
618. Act of Mar. 27, 2008, ch. 752, 2008 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-308.2 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
619. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
620. Act of Mar. 8, 2008, ch. 469, 2008 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
120.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
621. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
622. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:1 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
623. Act of Mar. 27, 2008, ch. 729, 2008 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
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nor, and includes a mandatory minimum fine of $500 or perfor-
mance of a mandatory minimum of fifty hours of community ser-
vice. 624 The driver's license must also now be suspended for one
year. 625
I. Misuse of Public Property
The misuse of public property for personal purposes is now a
Class 4 felony if the value of such use exceeds $1000 within a
twelve-month period.626
J. Public Defenders-Salary Supplements
The General Assembly authorized localities to supplement the
pay for public defenders, to parallel this authorization for prose-
cutors. 6 2 7
ANN. § 18.2-266.1 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
624. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266.1 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
625. Id.
626. Id. § 18.2-112.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
627. Act of Mar. 11, 2008, ch. 536, 2008 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
163.01:1 (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
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